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FRIENDSHIP
1
After what we have said, a discussion of friendship would naturally follow,
since it is a virtue or implies virtue, and is besides most necessary with a view to living. For without friends no one would choose to
live, though he had all other goods; even rich men and those in
possession of office and of dominating power are thought to need
friends most of all; for what is the use of such prosperity
without the opportunity of 343g63d beneficence, which is exercised
chiefly and in its most laudable form towards friends? Or how
can prosperity be guarded and preserved without friends? The greater it is, the more exposed is it to risk. And in poverty and in other
misfortunes men think friends are the only refuge. It helps the
young, too, to keep from error; it aids older people by
ministering to their needs and supplementing the activities that
are failing from weakness; those in the prime of life it
stimulates to noble actions-'two going together'-for with friends men are more able both to think and to act. Again, parent seems by
nature to feel it for offspring and offspring for parent, not
only among men but among birds and among most animals; it is
felt mutually by members of the same race, and especially by
men, whence we praise lovers of their fellowmen. We may even in
our travels how near and dear every man is to every other. Friendship
seems too to hold states together, and lawgivers to care more for
it than for justice; for unanimity seems to be something like friendship, and this they aim at most of all, and expel faction as their worst
enemy; and when men are friends they have no need of justice,
while when they are just they need friendship as well, and the
truest form of justice is thought to be a friendly quality.
But it is not only necessary but also noble; for we praise those who
love their friends, and it is thought to be a fine thing to have many friends; and again we think it is the same people that are good men
and are friends.
Not a few things about friendship are matters of debate. Some define it as a kind of likeness and say like people are friends, whence
come the sayings 'like to like', 'birds of a feather flock
together', and so on; others on the contrary say 'two of a trade
never agree'. On this very question they inquire for deeper and
more physical causes, Euripides saying that 'parched earth loves
the rain, and stately heaven when filled with rain loves to fall
to earth', and Heraclitus that 'it is what opposes that helps' and
'from different tones comes the fairest tune' and 'all things are produced through strife'; while Empedocles, as well as others, expresses the
opposite view that like aims at like. The physical problems we
may leave alone (for they do not belong to the present inquiry);
let us examine those which are human and involve character and
feeling, e.g. whether friendship can arise between any two
people or people cannot be friends if they are wicked, and
whether there is one species of friendship or more than one. Those who
think there is only one because it admits of degrees have relied on an
inadequate indication; for even things different in species admit of degree. We have discussed this matter previously.
2
The kinds of friendship may perhaps be cleared up if we first come to
know the object of love. For not everything seems to be loved but only the lovable, and this is good, pleasant, or useful; but it would
seem to be that by which some good or pleasure is produced that
is useful, so that it is the good and the useful that are
lovable as ends. Do men love, then, the good, or what is good
for them? These sometimes clash. So too with regard to the
pleasant. Now it is thought that each loves what is good for
himself, and that the good is without qualification lovable, and what is good for each man is lovable for him; but each man loves not
what is good for him but what seems good. This however will make
no difference; we shall just have to say that this is 'that
which seems lovable'. Now there are three grounds on which
people love; of the love of lifeless objects we do not use the
word 'friendship'; for it is not mutual love, nor is there a
wishing of good to the other (for it would surely be ridiculous to
wish wine well; if one wishes anything for it, it is that it may keep, so that one may have it oneself); but to a friend we say we ought
to wish what is good for his sake. But to those who thus wish
good we ascribe only goodwill, if the wish is not reciprocated;
goodwill when it is reciprocal being friendship. Or must we add
'when it is recognized'? For many people have goodwill to those
whom they have not seen but judge to be good or useful; and one
of these might return this feeling. These people seem to bear
goodwill to each other; but how could one call them friends when they do not know their mutual feelings? To be friends, then, the must be
mutually recognized as bearing goodwill and wishing well to each
other for one of the aforesaid reasons.
3
Now these reasons differ from each other in kind; so, therefore, do
the corresponding forms of love and friendship. There are therefore three
kinds of friendship, equal in number to the things that are lovable; for with respect to each there is a mutual and recognized love, and
those who love each other wish well to each other in that
respect in which they love one another. Now those who love each
other for their utility do not love each other for themselves
but in virtue of some good which they get from each other. So
too with those who love for the sake of pleasure; it is not for
their character that men love ready-witted people, but because they
find them pleasant. Therefore those who love for the sake of utility love for the sake of what is good for themselves, and those who
love for the sake of pleasure do so for the sake of what is
pleasant to themselves, and not in so far as the other is the
person loved but in so far as he is useful or pleasant. And thus
these friendships are only incidental; for it is not as being
the man he is that the loved person is loved, but as providing
some good or pleasure. Such friendships, then, are easily dissolved,
if the parties do not remain like themselves; for if the one party
is no longer pleasant or useful the other ceases to love him.
Now the useful is not permanent but is always changing. Thus when the
motive of the friendship is done away, the friendship is dissolved, inasmuch as it existed only for the ends in question. This kind of
friendship seems to exist chiefly between old people (for at
that age people pursue not the pleasant but the useful) and, of
those who are in their prime or young, between those who pursue
utility. And such people do not live much with each other
either; for sometimes they do not even find each other pleasant;
therefore they do not need such companionship unless they are useful
to each other; for they are pleasant to each other only in so far as
they rouse in each other hopes of something good to come. Among such friendships people also class the friendship of a host and guest.
On the other hand the friendship of young people seems to aim
at pleasure; for they live under the guidance of emotion, and
pursue above all what is pleasant to themselves and what is
immediately before them; but with increasing age their
pleasures become different. This is why they quickly become friends and quickly cease to be so; their friendship changes with the
object that is found pleasant, and such pleasure alters
quickly. Young people are amorous too; for the greater part of
the friendship of love depends on emotion and aims at pleasure;
this is why they fall in love and quickly fall out of love,
changing often within a single day. But these people do wish to spend
their days and lives together; for it is thus that they attain the purpose
of their friendship.
Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good, and alike in virtue; for these wish well alike to each other qua good, and
they are good themselves. Now those who wish well to their
friends for their sake are most truly friends; for they do this
by reason of own nature and not incidentally; therefore their
friendship lasts as long as they are good-and goodness is an
enduring thing. And each is good without qualification and to
his friend, for the good are both good without qualification and useful to each other. So too they are pleasant; for the good are pleasant
both without qualification and to each other, since to each his
own activities and others like them are pleasurable, and the
actions of the good are the same or like. And such a friendship
is as might be expected permanent, since there meet in it all
the qualities that friends should have. For all friendship is
for the sake of good or of pleasure-good or pleasure either in
the abstract or such as will be enjoyed by him who has the friendly feeling-and is based on a certain resemblance; and to a friendship
of good men all the qualities we have named belong in virtue of
the nature of the friends themselves; for in the case of this
kind of friendship the other qualities also are alike in both
friends, and that which is good without qualification is also
without qualification pleasant, and these are the most lovable
qualities. Love and friendship therefore are found most and in
their best form between such men.
But it is natural that such friendships should be infrequent; for such
men are rare. Further, such friendship requires time and familiarity; as the proverb says, men cannot know each other till they have
'eaten salt together'; nor can they admit each other to
friendship or be friends till each has been found lovable and
been trusted by each. Those who quickly show the marks of
friendship to each other wish to be friends, but are not
friends unless they both are lovable and know the fact; for a wish for
friendship may arise quickly, but friendship does not.
4
This kind of friendship, then, is perfect both in respect of duration and in all other respects, and in it each gets from each in all
respects the same as, or something like what, he gives; which
is what ought to happen between friends. Friendship for the
sake of pleasure bears a resemblance to this kind; for good
people too are pleasant to each other. So too does friendship
for the sake of utility; for the good are also useful to each other.
Among men of these inferior sorts too, friendships are most permanent when the friends get the same thing from each other (e.g.
pleasure), and not only that but also from the same source, as
happens between readywitted people, not as happens between
lover and beloved. For these do not take pleasure in the same
things, but the one in seeing the beloved and the other in
receiving attentions from his lover; and when the bloom of youth is
passing the friendship sometimes passes too (for the one finds no pleasure in the sight of the other, and the other gets no attentions from
the first); but many lovers on the other hand are constant, if
familiarity has led them to love each other's characters, these
being alike. But those who exchange not pleasure but utility in
their amour are both less truly friends and less constant.
Those who are friends for the sake of utility part when the
advantage is at an end; for they were lovers not of each other but of
profit.
For the sake of pleasure or utility, then, even bad men may be friends
of each other, or good men of bad, or one who is neither good nor bad
may be a friend to any sort of person, but for their own sake clearly only good men can be friends; for bad men do not delight in each
other unless some advantage come of the relation.
The friendship of the good too and this alone is proof against slander;
for it is not easy to trust any one talk about a man who has long been
tested by oneself; and it is among good men that trust and the feeling that 'he would never wrong me' and all the other things that are
demanded in true friendship are found. In the other kinds of
friendship, however, there is nothing to prevent these evils
arising. For men apply the name of friends even to those whose
motive is utility, in which sense states are said to be
friendly (for the alliances of states seem to aim at advantage), and
to those who love each other for the sake of pleasure, in which sense children are called friends. Therefore we too ought perhaps to
call such people friends, and say that there are several kinds
of friendship-firstly and in the proper sense that of good men
qua good, and by analogy the other kinds; for it is in virtue
of something good and something akin to what is found in true
friendship that they are friends, since even the pleasant is
good for the lovers of pleasure. But these two kinds of friendship are not often united, nor do the same people become friends for the
sake of utility and of pleasure; for things that are only
incidentally connected are not often coupled together.
Friendship being divided into these kinds, bad men will be friends for
the sake of pleasure or of utility, being in this respect like each other, but good men will be friends for their own sake, i.e. in
virtue of their goodness. These, then, are friends without
qualification; the others are friends incidentally and through
a resemblance to these.
5
As in regard to the virtues some men are called good in respect of
a state of character, others in respect of an activity, so too in the case of friendship; for those who live together delight in each
other and confer benefits on each other, but those who are
asleep or locally separated are not performing, but are
disposed to perform, the activities of friendship; distance
does not break off the friendship absolutely, but only the activity of it. But if the absence is lasting, it seems actually to make
men forget their friendship; hence the saying 'out of sight,
out of mind'. Neither old people nor sour people seem to make
friends easily; for there is little that is pleasant in them,
and no one can spend his days with one whose company is
painful, or not pleasant, since nature seems above all to avoid the
painful and to aim at the pleasant. Those, however, who approve of each
other but do not live together seem to be well-disposed rather than actual friends. For there is nothing so characteristic of friends
as living together (since while it people who are in need that
desire benefits, even those who are supremely happy desire to
spend their days together; for solitude suits such people least
of all); but people cannot live together if they are not
pleasant and do not enjoy the same things, as friends who are
companions seem to do.
The truest friendship, then, is that of the good, as we have frequently said; for that which is without qualification good or pleasant
seems to be lovable and desirable, and for each person that
which is good or pleasant to him; and the good man is lovable
and desirable to the good man for both these reasons. Now it
looks as if love were a feeling, friendship a state of
character; for love may be felt just as much towards lifeless things, but mutual love involves choice and choice springs from a state of
character; and men wish well to those whom they love, for their
sake, not as a result of feeling but as a result of a state of
character. And in loving a friend men love what is good for
themselves; for the good man in becoming a friend becomes a
good to his friend. Each, then, both loves what is good for himself, and makes an equal return in goodwill and in pleasantness; for
friendship is said to be equality, and both of these are found
most in the friendship of the good.
6
Between sour and elderly people friendship arises less readily, inasmuch
as they are less good-tempered and enjoy companionship less; for these
are thou to be the greatest marks of friendship productive of it. This
is why, while men become friends quickly, old men do not; it is because men do not become friends with those in whom they do not delight;
and similarly sour people do not quickly make friends either.
But such men may bear goodwill to each other; for they wish one
another well and aid one another in need; but they are hardly
friends because they do not spend their days together nor
delight in each other, and these are thought the greatest marks of friendship.
One cannot be a friend to many people in the sense of having friendship of the perfect type with them, just as one cannot be in love with
many people at once (for love is a sort of excess of feeling,
and it is the nature of such only to be felt towards one
person); and it is not easy for many people at the same time to
please the same person very greatly, or perhaps even to be good
in his eyes. One must, too, acquire some experience of the
other person and become familiar with him, and that is very hard. But
with a view to utility or pleasure it is possible that many people should
please one; for many people are useful or pleasant, and these services take little time.
Of these two kinds that which is for the sake of pleasure is the more
like friendship, when both parties get the same things from each other and delight in each other or in the things, as in the friendships
of the young; for generosity is more found in such friendships.
Friendship based on utility is for the commercially minded.
People who are supremely happy, too, have no need of useful
friends, but do need pleasant friends; for they wish to live
with some one and, though they can endure for a short time what
is painful, no one could put up with it continuously, nor even with
the Good itself if it were painful to him; this is why they look out for friends who are pleasant. Perhaps they should look out for
friends who, being pleasant, are also good, and good for them
too; for so they will have all the characteristics that friends
should have.
People in positions of authority seem to have friends who fall into
distinct classes; some people are useful to them and others are pleasant, but the same people are rarely both; for they seek neither those
whose pleasantness is accompanied by virtue nor those whose
utility is with a view to noble objects, but in their desire
for pleasure they seek for ready-witted people, and their other
friends they choose as being clever at doing what they are
told, and these characteristics are rarely combined. Now we have said
that the good man is at the same time pleasant and useful; but such a man does not become the friend of one who surpasses him in
station, unless he is surpassed also in virtue; if this is not
so, he does not establish equality by being proportionally
exceeded in both respects. But people who surpass him in both
respects are not so easy to find.
However that may be, the aforesaid friendships involve equality; for
the friends get the same things from one another and wish the same things
for one another, or exchange one thing for another, e.g. pleasure for
utility; we have said, however, that they are both less truly friendships and less permanent.
But it is from their likeness and their unlikeness to the same thing
that they are thought both to be and not to be friendships. It is by
their likeness to the friendship of virtue that they seem to be friendships (for one of them involves pleasure and the other utility, and
these characteristics belong to the friendship of virtue as
well); while it is because the friendship of virtue is proof
against slander and permanent, while these quickly change (besides
differing from the former in many other respects), that they appear not to be friendships; i.e. it is because of their unlikeness to
the friendship of virtue.
7
But there is another kind of friendship, viz. that which involves an
inequality between the parties, e.g. that of father to son and in general of elder to younger, that of man to wife and in general that of
ruler to subject. And these friendships differ also from each
other; for it is not the same that exists between parents and
children and between rulers and subjects, nor is even that of
father to son the same as that of son to father, nor that of
husband to wife the same as that of wife to husband. For the
virtue and the function of each of these is different, and so are the
reasons for which they love; the love and the friendship are therefore different also. Each party, then, neither gets the same from the
other, nor ought to seek it; but when children render to
parents what they ought to render to those who brought them
into the world, and parents render what they should to their
children, the friendship of such persons will be abiding and
excellent. In all friendships implying inequality the love also
should be proportional, i.e. the better should be more loved than he
loves, and so should the more useful, and similarly in each of the other cases; for when the love is in proportion to the merit of the
parties, then in a sense arises equality, which is certainly
held to be characteristic of friendship.
But equality does not seem to take the same form in acts of justice and in friendship; for in acts of justice what is equal in the
primary sense is that which is in proportion to merit, while
quantitative equality is secondary, but in friendship
quantitative equality is primary and proportion to merit
secondary. This becomes clear if there is a great interval in respect
of virtue or vice or wealth or anything else between the parties; for
then they are no longer friends, and do not even expect to be so. And this is most manifest in the case of the gods; for they surpass us
most decisively in all good things. But it is clear also in the
case of kings; for with them, too, men who are much their
inferiors do not expect to be friends; nor do men of no account
expect to be friends with the best or wisest men. In such cases
it is not possible to define exactly up to what point friends
can remain friends; for much can be taken away and friendship remain,
but when one party is removed to a great distance, as God is, the possibility
of friendship ceases. This is in fact the origin of the question whether
friends really wish for their friends the greatest goods, e.g. that
of being gods; since in that case their friends will no longer be friends
to them, and therefore will not be good things for them (for friends are good things). The answer is that if we were right in saying
that friend wishes good to friend for his sake, his friend must
remain the sort of being he is, whatever that may be; therefore
it is for him oily so long as he remains a man that he will
wish the greatest goods. But perhaps not all the greatest
goods; for it is for himself most of all that each man wishes
what is good.
8
Most people seem, owing to ambition, to wish to be loved rather than
to love; which is why most men love flattery; for the flatterer is a
friend in an inferior position, or pretends to be such and to love more than he is loved; and being loved seems to be akin to being
honoured, and this is what most people aim at. But it seems to
be not for its own sake that people choose honour, but
incidentally. For most people enjoy being honoured by those in
positions of authority because of their hopes (for they think
that if they want anything they will get it from them; and therefore they delight in honour as a token of favour to come); while those
who desire honour from good men, and men who know, are aiming
at confirming their own opinion of themselves; they delight in
honour, therefore, because they believe in their own goodness
on the strength of the judgement of those who speak about them.
In being loved, on the other hand, people delight for its own
sake; whence it would seem to be better than being honoured, and
friendship to be desirable in itself. But it seems to lie in loving rather than in being loved, as is indicated by the delight mothers
take in loving; for some mothers hand over their children to be
brought up, and so long as they know their fate they love them
and do not seek to be loved in return (if they cannot have
both), but seem to be satisfied if they see them prospering;
and they themselves love their children even if these owing to
their ignorance give them nothing of a mother's due. Now since
friendship depends more on loving, and it is those who love their friends
that are praised, loving seems to be the characteristic virtue of
friends, so that it is only those in whom this is found in due measure that are lasting friends, and only their friendship that endures.
It is in this way more than any other that even unequals can be friends;
they can be equalized. Now equality and likeness are friendship, and
especially the likeness of those who are like in virtue; for being steadfast
in themselves they hold fast to each other, and neither ask nor give
base services, but (one may say) even prevent them; for it is characteristic of good men neither to go wrong themselves nor to let their
friends do so. But wicked men have no steadfastness (for they
do not remain even like to themselves), but become friends for
a short time because they delight in each other's wickedness.
Friends who are useful or pleasant last longer; i.e. as long as
they provide each other with enjoyments or advantages. Friendship
for utility's sake seems to be that which most easily exists between
contraries, e.g. between poor and rich, between ignorant and learned; for what a man actually lacks he aims at, and one gives something
else in return. But under this head, too, might bring lover and
beloved, beautiful and ugly. This is why lovers sometimes seem
ridiculous, when they demand to be loved as they love; if they
are equally lovable their claim can perhaps be justified, but
when they have nothing lovable about them it is ridiculous. Perhaps,
however, contrary does not even aim at contrary by its own nature, but
only incidentally, the desire being for what is intermediate; for that is what is good, e.g. it is good for the dry not to become wet but
to come to the intermediate state, and similarly with the hot
and in all other cases. These subjects we may dismiss; for they
are indeed somewhat foreign to our inquiry.
9
Friendship and justice seem, as we have said at the outset of our discussion,
to be concerned with the same objects and exhibited between the
same persons. For in every community there is thought to be some form of justice, and friendship too; at least men address as friends
their fellow-voyagers and fellowsoldiers, and so too those
associated with them in any other kind of community. And the
extent of their association is the extent of their friendship,
as it is the extent to which justice exists between them. And
the proverb 'what friends have is common property' expresses the truth; for friendship depends on community. Now brothers and comrades
have all things in common, but the others to whom we have
referred have definite things in common-some more things,
others fewer; for of friendships, too, some are more and others
less truly friendships. And the claims of justice differ too;
the duties of parents to children, and those of brothers to each
other are not the same, nor those of comrades and those of fellow-citizens, and so, too, with the other kinds of friendship. There is a
difference, therefore, also between the acts that are unjust
towards each of these classes of associates, and the injustice
increases by being exhibited towards those who are friends in a
fuller sense; e.g. it is a more terrible thing to defraud a
comrade than a fellow-citizen, more terrible not to help a brother
than a stranger, and more terrible to wound a father than any one else.
And the demands of justice also seem to increase with the intensity of the friendship, which implies that friendship and justice exist
between the same persons and have an equal extension.
Now all forms of community are like parts of the political community; for men journey together with a view to some particular advantage,
and to provide something that they need for the purposes of
life; and it is for the sake of advantage that the political
community too seems both to have come together originally and
to endure, for this is what legislators aim at, and they call
just that which is to the common advantage. Now the other communities
aim at advantage bit by bit, e.g. sailors at what is advantageous
on a voyage with a view to making money or something of the kind,
fellow-soldiers at what is advantageous in war, whether it is wealth or victory or the taking of a city that they seek, and members of
tribes and demes act similarly (Some communities seem to arise
for the sake or pleasure, viz. religious guilds and social
clubs; for these exist respectively for the sake of offering
sacrifice and of companionship. But all these seem to fall
under the political community; for it aims not at present advantage
but at what is advantageous for life as a whole), offering sacrifices and arranging gatherings for the purpose, and assigning honours to
the gods, and providing pleasant relaxations for themselves.
For the ancient sacrifices and gatherings seem to take place
after the harvest as a sort of firstfruits, because it was at
these seasons that people had most leisure. All the
communities, then, seem to be parts of the political community; and
the particular kinds friendship will correspond to the particular kinds of community.
10
There are three kinds of constitution, and an equal number of
deviation-forms--perversions, as it were, of them. The
constitutions are monarchy, aristocracy, and thirdly that which
is based on a property qualification, which it seems appropriate to
call timocratic, though most people are wont to call it polity. The best of these is monarchy, the worst timocracy. The deviation from
monarchy is tyrany; for both are forms of one-man rule, but
there is the greatest difference between them; the tyrant looks
to his own advantage, the king to that of his subjects. For a
man is not a king unless he is sufficient to himself and excels
his subjects in all good things; and such a man needs nothing
further; therefore he will not look to his own interests but to those
of his subjects; for a king who is not like that would be a mere titular
king. Now tyranny is the very contrary of this; the tyrant pursues his
own good. And it is clearer in the case of tyranny that it is the worst deviation-form; but it is the contrary of the best that is worst.
Monarchy passes over into tyranny; for tyranny is the evil form
of one-man rule and the bad king becomes a tyrant. Aristocracy
passes over into oligarchy by the badness of the rulers, who
distribute contrary to equity what belongs to the city-all or
most of the good things to themselves, and office always to the
same people, paying most regard to wealth; thus the rulers are few and
are bad men instead of the most worthy. Timocracy passes over into democracy;
for these are coterminous, since it is the ideal even of timocracy to
be the rule of the majority, and all who have the property qualification count as equal. Democracy is the least bad of the deviations; for
in its case the form of constitution is but a slight deviation.
These then are the changes to which constitutions are most
subject; for these are the smallest and easiest transitions.
One may find resemblances to the constitutions and, as it were, patterns
of them even in households. For the association of a father with his
sons bears the form of monarchy, since the father cares for his children; and this is why Homer calls Zeus 'father'; it is the ideal of
monarchy to be paternal rule. But among the Persians the rule
of the father is tyrannical; they use their sons as slaves.
Tyrannical too is the rule of a master over slaves; for it is
the advantage of the master that is brought about in it. Now
this seems to be a correct form of government, but the Persian type
is perverted; for the modes of rule appropriate to different relations are diverse. The association of man and wife seems to be
aristocratic; for the man rules in accordance with his worth,
and in those matters in which a man should rule, but the
matters that befit a woman he hands over to her. If the man
rules in everything the relation passes over into oligarchy; for
in doing so he is not acting in accordance with their respective worth, and not ruling in virtue of his superiority. Sometimes, however,
women rule, because they are heiresses; so their rule is not in
virtue of excellence but due to wealth and power, as in
oligarchies. The association of brothers is like timocracy; for
they are equal, except in so far as they differ in age; hence
if they differ much in age, the friendship is no longer of the
fraternal type. Democracy is found chiefly in masterless dwellings (for
here every one is on an equality), and in those in which the ruler is
weak and every one has licence to do as he pleases.
11
Each of the constitutions may be seen to involve friendship just in
so far as it involves justice. The friendship between a king and his subjects depends on an excess of benefits conferred; for he
confers benefits on his subjects if being a good man he cares
for them with a view to their well-being, as a shepherd does
for his sheep (whence Homer called Agamemnon 'shepherd of the
peoples'). Such too is the friendship of a father, though this
exceeds the other in the greatness of the benefits conferred; for he
is responsible for the existence of his children, which is thought the greatest good, and for their nurture and upbringing.
These things are ascribed to ancestors as well. Further, by nature a
father tends to rule over his sons, ancestors over descendants, a king over his subjects. These friendships imply superiority of one
party over the other, which is why ancestors are honoured. The
justice therefore that exists between persons so related is not
the same on both sides but is in every case proportioned to
merit; for that is true of the friendship as well. The
friendship of man and wife, again, is the same that is found in
an aristocracy; for it is in accordance with virtue the better gets more of what is good, and each gets what befits him; and so, too,
with the justice in these relations. The friendship of brothers
is like that of comrades; for they are equal and of like age,
and such persons are for the most part like in their feelings
and their character. Like this, too, is the friendship
appropriate to timocratic government; for in such a constitution the
ideal is for the citizens to be equal and fair; therefore rule is taken in turn, and on equal terms; and the friendship appropriate here
will correspond.
But in the deviation-forms, as justice hardly exists, so too does friendship.
It exists least in the worst form; in tyranny there is little or
no friendship. For where there is nothing common to ruler and ruled, there is not friendship either, since there is not justice; e.g.
between craftsman and tool, soul and body, master and slave;
the latter in each case is benefited by that which uses it, but
there is no friendship nor justice towards lifeless things. But
neither is there friendship towards a horse or an ox, nor to a
slave qua slave. For there is nothing common to the two
parties; the slave is a living tool and the tool a lifeless slave.
Qua slave then, one cannot be friends with him. But qua man one can;
for there seems to be some justice between any man and any other who can share in a system of law or be a party to an agreement;
therefore there can also be friendship with him in so far as he
is a man. Therefore while in tyrannies friendship and justice
hardly exist, in democracies they exist more fully; for where the
citizens are equal they have much in common.
12
Every form of friendship, then, involves association, as has been said.
One might, however, mark off from the rest both the friendship of kindred
and that of comrades. Those of fellow-citizens, fellow-tribesmen, fellow-voyagers,
and the like are more like mere friendships of association; for
they seem to rest on a sort of compact. With them we might class the friendship of host and guest. The friendship of kinsmen itself,
while it seems to be of many kinds, appears to depend in every
case on parental friendship; for parents love their children as
being a part of themselves, and children their parents as being
something originating from them. Now (1) arents know their
offspring better than there children know that they are their
children, and (2) the originator feels his offspring to be his own
more than the offspring do their begetter; for the product belongs to
the producer (e.g. a tooth or hair or anything else to him whose it is), but the producer does not belong to the product, or belongs
in a less degree. And (3) the length of time produces the same
result; parents love their children as soon as these are born,
but children love their parents only after time has elapsed and
they have acquired understanding or the power of discrimination
by the senses. From these considerations it is also plain why
mothers love more than fathers do. Parents, then, love their children
as themselves (for their issue are by virtue of their separate existence
a sort of other selves), while children love their parents as being
born of them, and brothers love each other as being born of the same parents; for their identity with them makes them identical with
each other (which is the reason why people talk of 'the same
blood', 'the same stock', and so on). They are, therefore, in a
sense the same thing, though in separate individuals. Two
things that contribute greatly to friendship are a common upbringing
and similarity of age; for 'two of an age take to each other', and
people brought up together tend to be comrades; whence the friendship of brothers is akin to that of comrades. And cousins and other
kinsmen are bound up together by derivation from brothers, viz.
by being derived from the same parents. They come to be closer
together or farther apart by virtue of the nearness or distance
of the original ancestor.
The friendship of children to parents, and of men to gods, is a relation
to them as to something good and superior; for they have conferred the
greatest benefits, since they are the causes of their being and of their
nourishment, and of their education from their birth; and this kind of friendship possesses pleasantness and utility also, more than
that of strangers, inasmuch as their life is lived more in
common. The friendship of brothers has the characteristics
found in that of comrades (and especially when these are good),
and in general between people who are like each other, inasmuch
as they belong more to each other and start with a love for each other
from their very birth, and inasmuch as those born of the same parents and brought up together and similarly educated are more akin in
character; and the test of time has been applied most fully and
convincingly in their case.
Between other kinsmen friendly relations are found in due proportion. Between man and wife friendship seems to exist by nature; for man
is naturally inclined to form couples-even more than to form
cities, inasmuch as the household is earlier and more necessary
than the city, and reproduction is more common to man with the
animals. With the other animals the union extends only to this
point, but human beings live together not only for the sake of
reproduction but also for the various purposes of life; for from
the start the functions are divided, and those of man and woman are different; so they help each other by throwing their peculiar
gifts into the common stock. It is for these reasons that both
utility and pleasure seem to be found in this kind of
friendship. But this friendship may be based also on virtue, if
the parties are good; for each has its own virtue and they will
delight in the fact. And children seem to be a bond of union (which
is the reason why childless people part more easily); for children are
a good common to both and what is common holds them together.
How man and wife and in general friend and friend ought mutually to
behave seems to be the same question as how it is just for them to behave; for a man does not seem to have the same duties to a friend, a
stranger, a comrade, and a schoolfellow.
13
There are three kinds of friendship, as we said at the outset of our
inquiry, and in respect of each some are friends on an equality and others by virtue of a superiority (for not only can equally good
men become friends but a better man can make friends with a
worse, and similarly in friendships of pleasure or utility the
friends may be equal or unequal in the benefits they confer).
This being so, equals must effect the required equalization on
a basis of equality in love and in all other respects, while
unequals must render what is in proportion to their superiority or inferiority.
Complaints and reproaches arise either only or chiefly in the
friendship of utility, and this is only to be expected. For those who are friends on the ground of virtue are anxious to do well by each
other (since that is a mark of virtue and of friendship), and
between men who are emulating each other in this there cannot
be complaints or quarrels; no one is offended by a man who
loves him and does well by him-if he is a person of nice
feeling he takes his revenge by doing well by the other. And
the man who excels the other in the services he renders will not complain of his friend, since he gets what he aims at; for each man desires
what is good. Nor do complaints arise much even in friendships
of pleasure; for both get at the same time what they desire, if
they enjoy spending their time together; and even a man who
complained of another for not affording him pleasure would seem
ridiculous, since it is in his power not to spend his days with
him.
But the friendship of utility is full of complaints; for as they use
each other for their own interests they always want to get the better of the bargain, and think they have got less than they should, and
blame their partners because they do not get all they 'want and
deserve'; and those who do well by others cannot help them as
much as those whom they benefit want.
Now it seems that, as justice is of two kinds, one unwritten and the
other legal, one kind of friendship of utility is moral and the other legal. And so complaints arise most of all when men do not
dissolve the relation in the spirit of the same type of
friendship in which they contracted it. The legal type is that
which is on fixed terms; its purely commercial variety is on
the basis of immediate payment, while the more liberal variety allows
time but stipulates for a definite quid pro quo. In this variety the
debt is clear and not ambiguous, but in the postponement it contains an element of friendliness; and so some states do not allow suits
arising out of such agreements, but think men who have
bargained on a basis of credit ought to accept the
consequences. The moral type is not on fixed terms; it makes a
gift, or does whatever it does, as to a friend; but one expects
to receive as much or more, as having not given but lent; and if a
man is worse off when the relation is dissolved than he was when it was contracted he will complain. This happens because all or most men,
while they wish for what is noble, choose what is advantageous;
now it is noble to do well by another without a view to
repayment, but it is the receiving of benefits that is
advantageous. Therefore if we can we should return the
equivalent of what we have received (for we must not make a man our friend against his will; we must recognize that we were mistaken
at the first and took a benefit from a person we should not
have taken it from-since it was not from a friend, nor from one
who did it just for the sake of acting so-and we must settle up
just as if we had been benefited on fixed terms). Indeed, one
would agree to repay if one could (if one could not, even the
giver would not have expected one to do so); therefore if it is possible
we must repay. But at the outset we must consider the man by whom we
are being benefited and on what terms he is acting, in order that we may accept the benefit on these terms, or else decline it.
It is disputable whether we ought to measure a service by its utility to the receiver and make the return with a view to that, or by the
benevolence of the giver. For those who have received say they
have received from their benefactors what meant little to the
latter and what they might have got from others-minimizing the
service; while the givers, on the contrary, say it was the
biggest thing they had, and what could not have been got from
others, and that it was given in times of danger or similar need. Now
if the friendship is one that aims at utility, surely the advantage to the receiver is the measure. For it is he that asks for the
service, and the other man helps him on the assumption that he
will receive the equivalent; so the assistance has been
precisely as great as the advantage to the receiver, and
therefore he must return as much as he has received, or even
more (for that would be nobler). In friendships based on virtue on
the other hand, complaints do not arise, but the purpose of the doer is a sort of measure; for in purpose lies the essential element of
virtue and character.
14
Differences arise also in friendships based on superiority; for each
expects to get more out of them, but when this happens the friendship is dissolved. Not only does the better man think he ought to get
more, since more should be assigned to a good man, but the more
useful similarly expects this; they say a useless man should
not get as much as they should, since it becomes an act of
public service and not a friendship if the proceeds of the
friendship do not answer to the worth of the benefits conferred. For
they think that, as in a commercial partnership those who put more in
get more out, so it should be in friendship. But the man who is in a state of need and inferiority makes the opposite claim; they think
it is the part of a good friend to help those who are in need;
what, they say, is the use of being the friend of a good man or
a powerful man, if one is to get nothing out of it?
At all events it seems that each party is justified in his claim, and
that each should get more out of the friendship than the other-not more
of the same thing, however, but the superior more honour and the inferior more gain; for honour is the prize of virtue and of beneficence,
while gain is the assistance required by inferiority.
It seems to be so in constitutional arrangements also; the man who
contributes nothing good to the common stock is not honoured; for what belongs to the public is given to the man who benefits the public,
and honour does belong to the public. It is not possible to get
wealth from the common stock and at the same time honour. For
no one puts up with the smaller share in all things; therefore
to the man who loses in wealth they assign honour and to the
man who is willing to be paid, wealth, since the proportion to
merit equalizes the parties and preserves the friendship, as we
have said. This then is also the way in which we should associate with
unequals; the man who is benefited in respect of wealth or virtue must
give honour in return, repaying what he can. For friendship asks a man
to do what he can, not what is proportional to the merits of the case; since that cannot always be done, e.g. in honours paid to the gods
or to parents; for no one could ever return to them the
equivalent of what he gets, but the man who serves them to the
utmost of his power is thought to be a good man. This is why it
would not seem open to a man to disown his father (though a
father may disown his son); being in debt, he should repay, but
there is nothing by doing which a son will have done the equivalent of what he has received, so that he is always in debt. But
creditors can remit a debt; and a father can therefore do so
too. At the same time it is thought that presumably no one
would repudiate a son who was not far gone in wickedness; for
apart from the natural friendship of father and son it is human
nature not to reject a son's assistance. But the son, if he is
wicked, will naturally avoid aiding his father, or not be zealous about
it; for most people wish to get benefits, but avoid doing them, as a
thing unprofitable.-So much for these questions.
Nicomachean Ethics
By Aristotle
Written 350 B.C.E
Translated by W. D. Ross
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Table of Contents Book IX |
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1
In all friendships between dissimilars it is, as we have said, proportion that
equalizes the parties and preserves the friendship; e.g. in the political form
of friendship the shoemaker gets a return for his shoes in proportion to his
worth, and the weaver and all other craftsmen do the same. Now here a common
measure has been provided in the form of money, and therefore everything is
referred to this and measured by this; but in the friendship of lovers
sometimes the lover complains that his excess of love is not met by love in
return though perhaps there is nothing lovable about him), while often the
beloved complains that the lover who formerly promised everything now performs
nothing. Such incidents happen when the lover loves the beloved for the sake of
pleasure while the beloved loves the lover for the sake of utility, and they do
not both possess the qualities expected of them. If these be the objects of the
friendship it is dissolved when they do not get the things that formed the motives
of their love; for each did not love the other person himself but the qualities
he had, and these were not enduring; that is why the friendships also are
transient. But the love of characters, as has been said, endures because it is
self-dependent. Differences arise when what they get is something different and
not what they desire; for it is like getting nothing at all when we do not get
what we aim at; compare the story of the person who made promises to a
lyre-player, promising him the more, the better he sang, but in the morning,
when the other demanded the fulfilment of his promises, said that he had given
pleasure for pleasure. Now if this had been what each wanted, all would have
been well; but if the one wanted enjoyment but the other gain, and the one has
what he wants while the other has not, the terms of the association will not
have been properly fulfilled; for what each in fact wants is what he attends
to, and it is for the sake of that that that he will give what he has.
But who is to fix the worth of the service; he who makes the sacrifice or he
who has got the advantage? At any rate the other seems to leave it to him. This
is what they say Protagoras used to do; whenever he taught anything whatsoever,
he bade the learner assess the value of the knowledge, and accepted the amount
so fixed. But in such matters some men approve of the saying 'let a man have
his fixed reward'. Those who get the money first and then do none of the things
they said they would, owing to the extravagance of their promises, naturally
find themselves the objects of complaint; for they do not fulfil what they
agreed to. The sophists are perhaps compelled to do this because no one would
give money for the things they do know. These people then, if they do not do
what they have been paid for, are naturally made the objects of complaint.
But where there is no contract of service, those who give up something for the
sake of the other party cannot (as we have said) be complained of (for that is
the nature of the friendship of virtue), and the return to them must be made on
the basis of their purpose (for it is purpose that is the characteristic thing
in a friend and in virtue). And so too, it seems, should one make a return to
those with whom one has studied philosophy; for their worth cannot be measured
against money, and they can get no honour which will balance their services,
but still it is perhaps enough, as it is with the gods and with one's parents,
to give them what one can.
If the gift was not of this sort, but was made with a view to a return, it is
no doubt preferable that the return made should be one that seems fair to both
parties, but if this cannot be achieved, it would seem not only necessary that
the person who gets the first service should fix the reward, but also just; for
if the other gets in return the equivalent of the advantage the beneficiary has
received, or the price lie would have paid for the pleasure, he will have got
what is fair as from the other.
We see this happening too with things put up for sale, and in some places there
are laws providing that no actions shall arise out of voluntary contracts, on
the assumption that one should settle with a person to whom one has given
credit, in the spirit in which one bargained with him. The law holds that it is
more just that the person to whom credit was given should fix the terms than
that the person who gave credit should do so. For most things are not assessed
at the same value by those who have them and those who want them; each class
values highly what is its own and what it is offering; yet the return is made
on the terms fixed by the receiver. But no doubt the receiver should assess a
thing not at what it seems worth when he has it, but at what he assessed it at
before he had it.
2
A further problem is set by such questions as, whether one should in all things
give the preference to one's father and obey him, or whether when one is ill
one should trust a doctor, and when one has to elect a general should elect a
man of military skill; and similarly whether one should render a service by
preference to a friend or to a good man, and should show gratitude to a
benefactor or oblige a friend, if one cannot do both.
All such questions are hard, are they not, to decide with precision? For they admit
of many variations of all sorts in respect both of the magnitude of the service
and of its nobility necessity. But that we should not give the preference in
all things to the same person is plain enough; and we must for the most part
return benefits rather than oblige friends, as we must pay back a loan to a
creditor rather than make one to a friend. But perhaps even this is not always
true; e.g. should a man who has been ransomed out of the hands of brigands
ransom his ransomer in return, whoever he may be (or pay him if he has not been
captured but demands payment) or should he ransom his father? It would seem
that he should ransom his father in preference even to himself. As we have
said, then, generally the debt should be paid, but if the gift is exceedingly
noble or exceedingly necessary, one should defer to these considerations. For
sometimes it is not even fair to return the equivalent of what one has
received, when the one man has done a service to one whom he knows to be good,
while the other makes a return to one whom he believes to be bad. For that
matter, one should sometimes not lend in return to one who has lent to oneself;
for the one person lent to a good man, expecting to recover his loan, while the
other has no hope of recovering from one who is believed to be bad. Therefore
if the facts really are so, the demand is not fair; and if they are not, but
people think they are, they would be held to be doing nothing strange in
refusing. As we have often pointed out, then, discussions about feelings and
actions have just as much definiteness as their subject-matter.
That we should not make the same return to every one, nor give a father the
preference in everything, as one does not sacrifice everything to Zeus, is
plain enough; but since we ought to render different things to parents,
brothers, comrades, and benefactors, we ought to render to each class what is
appropriate and becoming. And this is what people seem in fact to do; to
marriages they invite their kinsfolk; for these have a part in the family and
therefore in the doings that affect the family; and at funerals also they think
that kinsfolk, before all others, should meet, for the same reason. And it
would be thought that in the matter of food we should help our parents before
all others, since we owe our own nourishment to them, and it is more honourable
to help in this respect the authors of our being even before ourselves; and
honour too one should give to one's parents as one does to the gods, but not
any and every honour; for that matter one should not give the same honour to
one's father and one's mother, nor again should one give them the honour due to
a philosopher or to a general, but the honour due to a father, or again to a
mother. To all older persons, too, one should give honour appropriate to their
age, by rising to receive them and finding seats for them and so on; while to
comrades and brothers one should allow freedom of speech and common use of all
things. To kinsmen, too, and fellow-tribesmen and fellow-citizens and to every
other class one should always try to assign what is appropriate, and to compare
the claims of each class with respect to nearness of relation and to virtue or
usefulness. The comparison is easier when the persons belong to the same class,
and more laborious when they are different. Yet we must not on that account
shrink from the task, but decide the question as best we can.
3
Another question that arises is whether friendships should or should not be
broken off when the other party does not remain the same. Perhaps we may say
that there is nothing strange in breaking off a friendship based on utility or
pleasure, when our friends no longer have these attributes. For it was of these
attributes that we were the friends; and when these have failed it is
reasonable to love no longer. But one might complain of another if, when he
loved us for our usefulness or pleasantness, he pretended to love us for our
character. For, as we said at the outset, most differences arise between
friends when they are not friends in the spirit in which they think they are.
So when a man has deceived himself and has thought he was being loved for his
character, when the other person was doing nothing of the kind, he must blame
himself; when he has been deceived by the pretences of the other person, it is
just that he should complain against his deceiver; he will complain with more
justice than one does against people who counterfeit the currency, inasmuch as
the wrongdoing is concerned with something more valuable.
But if one accepts another man as good, and he turns out badly and is seen to
do so, must one still love him? Surely it is impossible, since not everything
can be loved, but only what is good. What is evil neither can nor should be
loved; for it is not one's duty to be a lover of evil, nor to become like what
is bad; and we have said that like is dear like. Must the friendship, then, be
forthwith broken off? Or is this not so in all cases, but only when one's
friends are incurable in their wickedness? If they are capable of being
reformed one should rather come to the assistance of their character or their
property, inasmuch as this is better and more characteristic of friendship. But
a man who breaks off such a friendship would seem to be doing nothing strange;
for it was not to a man of this sort that he was a friend; when his friend has
changed, therefore, and he is unable to save him, he gives him up.
But if one friend remained the same while the other became better and far
outstripped him in virtue, should the latter treat the former as a friend?
Surely he cannot. When the interval is great this becomes most plain, e.g. in
the case of childish friendships; if one friend remained a child in intellect
while the other became a fully developed man, how could they be friends when
they neither approved of the same things nor delighted in and were pained by
the same things? For not even with regard to each other will their tastes
agree, and without this (as we saw) they cannot be friends; for they cannot
live together. But we have discussed these matters.
Should he, then, behave no otherwise towards him than he would if he had never
been his friend? Surely he should keep a remembrance of their former intimacy,
and as we think we ought to oblige friends rather than strangers, so to those
who have been our friends we ought to make some allowance for our former
friendship, when the breach has not been due to excess of wickedness.
4
Friendly relations with one's neighbours, and the marks by which friendships
are defined, seem to have proceeded from a man's relations to himself. For (1)
we define a friend as one who wishes and does what is good, or seems so, for
the sake of his friend, or (2) as one who wishes his friend to exist and live,
for his sake; which mothers do to their children, and friends do who have come
into conflict. And (3) others define him as one who lives with and (4) has the
same tastes as another, or (5) one who grieves and rejoices with his friend;
and this too is found in mothers most of all. It is by some one of these
characterstics that friendship too is defined.
Now each of these is true of the good man's relation to himself (and of all
other men in so far as they think themselves good; virtue and the good man
seem, as has been said, to be the measure of every class of things). For his
opinions are harmonious, and he desires the same things with all his soul; and
therefore he wishes for himself what is good and what seems so, and does it
(for it is characteristic of the good man to work out the good), and does so
for his own sake (for he does it for the sake of the intellectual element in
him, which is thought to be the man himself); and he wishes himself to live and
be preserved, and especially the element by virtue of which he thinks. For existence
is good to the virtuous man, and each man wishes himself what is good, while no
one chooses to possess the whole world if he has first to become some one else
(for that matter, even now God possesses the good); he wishes for this only on
condition of being whatever he is; and the element that thinks would seem to be
the individual man, or to be so more than any other element in him. And such a
man wishes to live with himself; for he does so with pleasure, since the
memories of his past acts are delightful and his hopes for the future are good,
and therefore pleasant. His mind is well stored too with subjects of
contemplation. And he grieves and rejoices, more than any other, with himself;
for the same thing is always painful, and the same thing always pleasant, and
not one thing at one time and another at another; he has, so to speak, nothing
to repent of.
Therefore, since each of these characteristics belongs to the good man in
relation to himself, and he is related to his friend as to himself (for his
friend is another self), friendship too is thought to be one of these
attributes, and those who have these attributes to be friends. Whether there is
or is not friendship between a man and himself is a question we may dismiss for
the present; there would seem to be friendship in so far as he is two or more,
to judge from the afore-mentioned attributes of friendship, and from the fact
that the extreme of friendship is likened to one's love for oneself.
But the attributes named seem to belong even to the majority of men, poor
creatures though they may be. Are we to say then that in so far as they are
satisfied with themselves and think they are good, they share in these
attributes? Certainly no one who is thoroughly bad and impious has these
attributes, or even seems to do so. They hardly belong even to inferior people;
for they are at variance with themselves, and have appetites for some things
and rational desires for others. This is true, for instance, of incontinent
people; for they choose, instead of the things they themselves think good,
things that are pleasant but hurtful; while others again, through cowardice and
laziness, shrink from doing what they think best for themselves. And those who
have done many terrible deeds and are hated for their wickedness even shrink
from life and destroy themselves. And wicked men seek for people with whom to
spend their days, and shun themselves; for they remember many a grevious deed,
and anticipate others like them, when they are by themselves, but when they are
with others they forget. And having nothing lovable in them they have no
feeling of love to themselves. Therefore also such men do not rejoice or grieve
with themselves; for their soul is rent by faction, and one element in it by
reason of its wickedness grieves when it abstains from certain acts, while the
other part is pleased, and one draws them this way and the other that, as if
they were pulling them in pieces. If a man cannot at the same time be pained
and pleased, at all events after a short time he is pained because he was
pleased, and he could have wished that these things had not been pleasant to
him; for bad men are laden with repentance.
Therefore the bad man does not seem to be amicably disposed even to himself,
because there is nothing in him to love; so that if to be thus is the height of
wretchedness, we should strain every nerve to avoid wickedness and should
endeavour to be good; for so and only so can one be either friendly to oneself
or a friend to another.
5
Goodwill is a friendly sort of relation, but is not identical with friendship;
for one may have goodwill both towards people whom one does not know, and
without their knowing it, but not friendship. This has indeed been said
already.' But goodwill is not even friendly feeling. For it does not involve
intensity or desire, whereas these accompany friendly feeling; and friendly
feeling implies intimacy while goodwill may arise of a sudden, as it does
towards competitors in a contest; we come to feel goodwill for them and to
share in their wishes, but we would not do anything with them; for, as we said,
we feel goodwill suddenly and love them only superficially.
Goodwill seems, then, to be a beginning of friendship, as the pleasure of the
eye is the beginning of love. For no one loves if he has not first been
delighted by the form of the beloved, but he who delights in the form of
another does not, for all that, love him, but only does so when he also longs
for him when absent and craves for his presence; so too it is not possible for
people to be friends if they have not come to feel goodwill for each other, but
those who feel goodwill are not for all that friends; for they only wish well
to those for whom they feel goodwill, and would not do anything with them nor
take trouble for them. And so one might by an extension of the term friendship
say that goodwill is inactive friendship, though when it is prolonged and
reaches the point of intimacy it becomes friendship-not the friendship based on
utility nor that based on pleasure; for goodwill too does not arise on those
terms. The man who has received a benefit bestows goodwill in return for what
has been done to him, but in doing so is only doing what is just; while he who
wishes some one to prosper because he hopes for enrichment through him seems to
have goodwill not to him but rather to himself, just as a man is not a friend
to another if he cherishes him for the sake of some use to be made of him. In
general, goodwill arises on account of some excellence and worth, when one man
seems to another beautiful or brave or something of the sort, as we pointed out
in the case of competitors in a contest.
6
Unanimity also seems to be a friendly relation. For this reason it is not
identity of opinion; for that might occur even with people who do not know each
other; nor do we say that people who have the same views on any and every
subject are unanimous, e.g. those who agree about the heavenly bodies (for
unanimity about these is not a friendly relation), but we do say that a city is
unanimous when men have the same opinion about what is to their interest, and
choose the same actions, and do what they have resolved in common. It is about
things to be done, therefore, that people are said to be unanimous, and, among
these, about matters of consequence and in which it is possible for both or all
parties to get what they want; e.g. a city is unanimous when all its citizens
think that the offices in it should be elective, or that they should form an
alliance with Sparta, or that Pittacus should be their ruler-at a time when he
himself was also willing to rule. But when each of two people wishes himself to
have the thing in question, like the captains in the Phoenissae, they are in a
state of faction; for it is not unanimity when each of two parties thinks of
the same thing, whatever that may be, but only when they think of the same
thing in the same hands, e.g. when both the common people and those of the
better class wish the best men to rule; for thus and thus alone do all get what
they aim at. Unanimity seems, then, to be political friendship, as indeed it is
commonly said to be; for it is concerned with things that are to our interest
and have an influence on our life.
Now such unanimity is found among good men; for they are unanimous both in themselves
and with one another, being, so to say, of one mind (for the wishes of such men
are constant and not at the mercy of opposing currents like a strait of the
sea), and they wish for what is just and what is advantageous, and these are
the objects of their common endeavour as well. But bad men cannot be unanimous
except to a small extent, any more than they can be friends, since they aim at
getting more than their share of advantages, while in labour and public service
they fall short of their share; and each man wishing for advantage to himself
criticizes his neighbour and stands in his way; for if people do not watch it
carefully the common weal is soon destroyed. The result is that they are in a
state of faction, putting compulsion on each other but unwilling themselves to
do what is just.
7
Benefactors are thought to love those they have benefited, more than those who
have been well treated love those that have treated them well, and this is
discussed as though it were paradoxical. Most people think it is because the
latter are in the position of debtors and the former of creditors; and
therefore as, in the case of loans, debtors wish their creditors did not exist,
while creditors actually take care of the safety of their debtors, so it is
thought that benefactors wish the objects of their action to exist since they
will then get their gratitude, while the beneficiaries take no interest in
making this return. Epicharmus would perhaps declare that they say this because
they 'look at things on their bad side', but it is quite like human nature; for
most people are forgetful, and are more anxious to be well treated than to
treat others well. But the cause would seem to be more deeply rooted in the
nature of things; the case of those who have lent money is not even analogous.
For they have no friendly feeling to their debtors, but only a wish that they
may kept safe with a view to what is to be got from them; while those who have
done a service to others feel friendship and love for those they have served
even if these are not of any use to them and never will be. This is what
happens with craftsmen too; every man loves his own handiwork better than he
would be loved by it if it came alive; and this happens perhaps most of all
with poets; for they have an excessive love for their own poems, doting on them
as if they were their children. This is what the position of benefactors is
like; for that which they have treated well is their handiwork, and therefore
they love this more than the handiwork does its maker. The cause of this is
that existence is to all men a thing to be chosen and loved, and that we exist
by virtue of activity (i.e. by living and acting), and that the handiwork is in
a sense, the producer in activity; he loves his handiwork, therefore, because
he loves existence. And this is rooted in the nature of things; for what he is
in potentiality, his handiwork manifests in activity.
At the same time to the benefactor that is noble which depends on his action,
so that he delights in the object of his action, whereas to the patient there
is nothing noble in the agent, but at most something advantageous, and this is
less pleasant and lovable. What is pleasant is the activity of the present, the
hope of the future, the memory of the past; but most pleasant is that which
depends on activity, and similarly this is most lovable. Now for a man who has
made something his work remains (for the noble is lasting), but for the person
acted on the utility passes away. And the memory of noble things is pleasant,
but that of useful things is not likely to be pleasant, or is less so; though
the reverse seems true of expectation.
Further, love is like activity, being loved like passivity; and loving and its
concomitants are attributes of those who are the more active.
Again, all men love more what they have won by labour; e.g. those who have made
their money love it more than those who have inherited it; and to be well
treated seems to involve no labour, while to treat others well is a laborious
task. These are the reasons, too, why mothers are fonder of their children than
fathers; bringing them into the world costs them more pains, and they know
better that the children are their own. This last point, too, would seem to
apply to benefactors.
8
The question is also debated, whether a man should love himself most, or some
one else. People criticize those who love themselves most, and call them
self-lovers, using this as an epithet of disgrace, and a bad man seems to do
everything for his own sake, and the more so the more wicked he is-and so men
reproach him, for instance, with doing nothing of his own accord-while the good
man acts for honour's sake, and the more so the better he is, and acts for his
friend's sake, and sacrifices his own interest.
But the facts clash with these arguments, and this is not surprising. For men
say that one ought to love best one's best friend, and man's best friend is one
who wishes well to the object of his wish for his sake, even if no one is to
know of it; and these attributes are found most of all in a man's attitude
towards himself, and so are all the other attributes by which a friend is
defined; for, as we have said, it is from this relation that all the
characteristics of friendship have extended to our neighbours. All the
proverbs, too, agree with this, e.g. 'a single soul', and 'what friends have is
common property', and 'friendship is equality', and 'charity begins at home';
for all these marks will be found most in a man's relation to himself; he is
his own best friend and therefore ought to love himself best. It is therefore a
reasonable question, which of the two views we should follow; for both are
plausible.
Perhaps we ought to mark off such arguments from each other and determine how
far and in what respects each view is right. Now if we grasp the sense in which
each school uses the phrase 'lover of self', the truth may become evident.
Those who use the term as one of reproach ascribe self-love to people who
assign to themselves the greater share of wealth, honours, and bodily
pleasures; for these are what most people desire, and busy themselves about as
though they were the best of all things, which is the reason, too, why they
become objects of competition. So those who are grasping with regard to these
things gratify their appetites and in general their feelings and the irrational
element of the soul; and most men are of this nature (which is the reason why
the epithet has come to be used as it is-it takes its meaning from the
prevailing type of self-love, which is a bad one); it is just, therefore, that
men who are lovers of self in this way are reproached for being so. That it is
those who give themselves the preference in regard to objects of this sort that
most people usually call lovers of self is plain; for if a man were always
anxious that he himself, above all things, should act justly, temperately, or
in accordance with any other of the virtues, and in general were always to try
to secure for himself the honourable course, no one will call such a man a lover
of self or blame him.
But such a man would seem more than the other a lover of self; at all events he
assigns to himself the things that are noblest and best, and gratifies the most
authoritative element in and in all things obeys this; and just as a city or
any other systematic whole is most properly identified with the most
authoritative element in it, so is a man; and therefore the man who loves this
and gratifies it is most of all a lover of self. Besides, a man is said to have
or not to have self-control according as his reason has or has not the control,
on the assumption that this is the man himself; and the things men have done on
a rational principle are thought most properly their own acts and voluntary
acts. That this is the man himself, then, or is so more than anything else, is
plain, and also that the good man loves most this part of him. Whence it
follows that he is most truly a lover of self, of another type than that which
is a matter of reproach, and as different from that as living according to a
rational principle is from living as passion dictates, and desiring what is
noble from desiring what seems advantageous. Those, then, who busy themselves
in an exceptional degree with noble actions all men approve and praise; and if
all were to strive towards what is noble and strain every nerve to do the
noblest deeds, everything would be as it should be for the common weal, and
every one would secure for himself the goods that are greatest, since virtue is
the greatest of goods.
Therefore the good man should be a lover of self (for he will both himself
profit by doing noble acts, and will benefit his fellows), but the wicked man
should not; for he will hurt both himself and his neighbours, following as he
does evil passions. For the wicked man, what he does clashes with what he ought
to do, but what the good man ought to do he does; for reason in each of its
possessors chooses what is best for itself, and the good man obeys his reason.
It is true of the good man too that he does many acts for the sake of his
friends and his country, and if necessary dies for them; for he will throw away
both wealth and honours and in general the goods that are objects of
competition, gaining for himself nobility; since he would prefer a short period
of intense pleasure to a long one of mild enjoyment, a twelvemonth of noble
life to many years of humdrum existence, and one great and noble action to many
trivial ones. Now those who die for others doubtless attain this result; it is
therefore a great prize that they choose for themselves. They will throw away
wealth too on condition that their friends will gain more; for while a man's
friend gains wealth he himself achieves nobility; he is therefore assigning the
greater good to himself. The same too is true of honour and office; all these
things he will sacrifice to his friend; for this is noble and laudable for
himself. Rightly then is he thought to be good, since he chooses nobility
before all else. But he may even give up actions to his friend; it may be
nobler to become the cause of his friend's acting than to act himself. In all
the actions, therefore, that men are praised for, the good man is seen to
assign to himself the greater share in what is noble. In this sense, then, as
has been said, a man should be a lover of self; but in the sense in which most
men are so, he ought not.
9
It is also disputed whether the happy man will need friends or not. It is said
that those who are supremely happy and self-sufficient have no need of friends;
for they have the things that are good, and therefore being self-sufficient
they need nothing further, while a friend, being another self, furnishes what a
man cannot provide by his own effort; whence the saying 'when fortune is kind,
what need of friends?' But it seems strange, when one assigns all good things
to the happy man, not to assign friends, who are thought the greatest of
external goods. And if it is more characteristic of a friend to do well by
another than to be well done by, and to confer benefits is characteristic of
the good man and of virtue, and it is nobler to do well by friends than by
strangers, the good man will need people to do well by. This is why the
question is asked whether we need friends more in prosperity or in adversity,
on the assumption that not only does a man in adversity need people to confer
benefits on him, but also those who are prospering need people to do well by.
Surely it is strange, too, to make the supremely happy man a solitary; for no
one would choose the whole world on condition of being alone, since man is a
political creature and one whose nature is to live with others. Therefore even
the happy man lives with others; for he has the things that are by nature good.
And plainly it is better to spend his days with friends and good men than with
strangers or any chance persons. Therefore the happy man needs friends.
What then is it that the first school means, and in what respect is it right?
Is it that most identify friends with useful people? Of such friends indeed the
supremely happy man will have no need, since he already has the things that are
good; nor will he need those whom one makes one's friends because of their
pleasantness, or he will need them only to a small extent (for his life, being
pleasant, has no need of adventitious pleasure); and because he does not need
such friends he is thought not to need friends.
But that is surely not true. For we have said at the outset that happiness is
an activity; and activity plainly comes into being and is not present at the
start like a piece of property. If (1) happiness lies in living and being
active, and the good man's activity is virtuous and pleasant in itself, as we
have said at the outset, and (2) a thing's being one's own is one of the
attributes that make it pleasant, and (3) we can contemplate our neighbours
better than ourselves and their actions better than our own, and if the actions
of virtuous men who are their friends are pleasant to good men (since these
have both the attributes that are naturally pleasant),-if this be so, the
supremely happy man will need friends of this sort, since his purpose is to
contemplate worthy actions and actions that are his own, and the actions of a
good man who is his friend have both these qualities.
Further, men think that the happy man ought to live pleasantly. Now if he were
a solitary, life would be hard for him; for by oneself it is not easy to be
continuously active; but with others and towards others it is easier. With
others therefore his activity will be more continuous, and it is in itself
pleasant, as it ought to be for the man who is supremely happy; for a good man
qua good delights in virtuous actions and is vexed at vicious ones, as a
musical man enjoys beautiful tunes but is pained at bad ones. A certain
training in virtue arises also from the company of the good, as Theognis has
said before us.
If we look deeper into the nature of things, a virtuous friend seems to be
naturally desirable for a virtuous man. For that which is good by nature, we
have said, is for the virtuous man good and pleasant in itself. Now life is
defined in the case of animals by the power of perception in that of man by the
power of perception or thought; and a power is defined by reference to the
corresponding activity, which is the essential thing; therefore life seems to
be essentially the act of perceiving or thinking. And life is among the things
that are good and pleasant in themselves, since it is determinate and the
determinate is of the nature of the good; and that which is good by nature is
also good for the virtuous man (which is the reason why life seems pleasant to
all men); but we must not apply this to a wicked and corrupt life nor to a life
spent in pain; for such a life is indeterminate, as are its attributes. The
nature of pain will become plainer in what follows. But if life itself is good
and pleasant (which it seems to be, from the very fact that all men desire it,
and particularly those who are good and supremely happy; for to such men life
is most desirable, and their existence is the most supremely happy) and if he
who sees perceives that he sees, and he who hears, that he hears, and he who
walks, that he walks, and in the case of all other activities similarly there
is something which perceives that we are active, so that if we perceive, we
perceive that we perceive, and if we think, that we think; and if to perceive
that we perceive or think is to perceive that we exist (for existence was
defined as perceiving or thinking); and if perceiving that one lives is in
itself one of the things that are pleasant (for life is by nature good, and to
perceive what is good present in oneself is pleasant); and if life is
desirable, and particularly so for good men, because to them existence is good
and pleasant for they are pleased at the consciousness of the presence in them
of what is in itself good); and if as the virtuous man is to himself, he is to
his friend also (for his friend is another self):-if all this be true, as his
own being is desirable for each man, so, or almost so, is that of his friend.
Now his being was seen to be desirable because he perceived his own goodness,
and such perception is pleasant in itself. He needs, therefore, to be conscious
of the existence of his friend as well, and this will be realized in their
living together and sharing in discussion and thought; for this is what living
together would seem to mean in the case of man, and not, as in the case of
cattle, feeding in the same place.
If, then, being is in itself desirable for the supremely happy man (since it is
by its nature good and pleasant), and that of his friend is very much the same,
a friend will be one of the things that are desirable. Now that which is
desirable for him he must have, or he will be deficient in this respect. The
man who is to be happy will therefore need virtuous friends.
10
Should we, then, make as many friends as possible, or-as in the case of
hospitality it is thought to be suitable advice, that one should be 'neither a
man of many guests nor a man with none'-will that apply to friendship as well;
should a man neither be friendless nor have an excessive number of friends?
To friends made with a view to utility this saying would seem thoroughly
applicable; for to do services to many people in return is a laborious task and
life is not long enough for its performance. Therefore friends in excess of
those who are sufficient for our own life are superfluous, and hindrances to
the noble life; so that we have no need of them. Of friends made with a view to
pleasure, also, few are enough, as a little seasoning in food is enough.
But as regards good friends, should we have as many as possible, or is there a
limit to the number of one's friends, as there is to the size of a city? You
cannot make a city of ten men, and if there are a hundred thousand it is a city
no longer. But the proper number is presumably not a single number, but
anything that falls between certain fixed points. So for friends too there is a
fixed number perhaps the largest number with whom one can live together (for
that, we found, thought to be very characteristic of friendship); and that one
cannot live with many people and divide oneself up among them is plain.
Further, they too must be friends of one another, if they are all to spend
their days together; and it is a hard business for this condition to be
fulfilled with a large number. It is found difficult, too, to rejoice and to
grieve in an intimate way with many people, for it may likely happen that one
has at once to be happy with one friend and to mourn with another. Presumably,
then, it is well not to seek to have as many friends as possible, but as many
as are enough for the purpose of living together; for it would seem actually
impossible to be a great friend to many people. This is why one cannot love several
people; love is ideally a sort of excess of friendship, and that can only be
felt towards one person; therefore great friendship too can only be felt
towards a few people. This seems to be confirmed in practice; for we do not
find many people who are friends in the comradely way of friendship, and the
famous friendships of this sort are always between two people. Those who have
many friends and mix intimately with them all are thought to be no one's
friend, except in the way proper to fellow-citizens, and such people are also
called obsequious. In the way proper to fellow-citizens, indeed, it is possible
to be the friend of many and yet not be obsequious but a genuinely good man;
but one cannot have with many people the friendship based on virtue and on the
character of our friends themselves, and we must be content if we find even a
few such.
11
Do we need friends more in good fortune or in bad? They are sought after in
both; for while men in adversity need help, in prosperity they need people to
live with and to make the objects of their beneficence; for they wish to do
well by others. Friendship, then, is more necessary in bad fortune, and so it
is useful friends that one wants in this case; but it is more noble in good
fortune, and so we also seek for good men as our friends, since it is more
desirable to confer benefits on these and to live with these. For the very
presence of friends is pleasant both in good fortune and also in bad, since
grief is lightened when friends sorrow with us. Hence one might ask whether
they share as it were our burden, or-without that happening-their presence by
its pleasantness, and the thought of their grieving with us, make our pain
less. Whether it is for these reasons or for some other that our grief is
lightened, is a question that may be dismissed; at all events what we have
described appears to take place.
But their presence seems to contain a mixture of various factors. The very
seeing of one's friends is pleasant, especially if one is in adversity, and
becomes a safeguard against grief (for a friend tends to comfort us both by the
sight of him and by his words, if he is tactful, since he knows our character
and the things that please or pain us); but to see him pained at our
misfortunes is painful; for every one shuns being a cause of pain to his
friends. For this reason people of a manly nature guard against making their
friends grieve with them, and, unless he be exceptionally insensible to pain,
such a man cannot stand the pain that ensues for his friends, and in general
does not admit fellow-mourners because he is not himself given to mourning; but
women and womanly men enjoy sympathisers in their grief, and love them as
friends and companions in sorrow. But in all things one obviously ought to
imitate the better type of person.
On the other hand, the presence of friends in our prosperity implies both a
pleasant passing of our time and the pleasant thought of their pleasure at our
own good fortune. For this cause it would seem that we ought to summon our friends
readily to share our good fortunes (for the beneficent character is a noble
one), but summon them to our bad fortunes with hesitation; for we ought to give
them as little a share as possible in our evils whence the saying 'enough is my
misfortune'. We should summon friends to us most of all when they are likely by
suffering a few inconveniences to do us a great service.
Conversely, it is fitting to go unasked and readily to the aid of those in
adversity (for it is characteristic of a friend to render services, and
especially to those who are in need and have not demanded them; such action is
nobler and pleasanter for both persons); but when our friends are prosperous we
should join readily in their activities (for they need friends for these too), but
be tardy in coming forward to be the objects of their kindness; for it is not
noble to be keen to receive benefits. Still, we must no doubt avoid getting the
reputation of kill-joys by repulsing them; for that sometimes happens.
The presence of friends, then, seems desirable in all circumstances.
12
Does it not follow, then, that, as for lovers the sight of the beloved is the
thing they love most, and they prefer this sense to the others because on it
love depends most for its being and for its origin, so for friends the most
desirable thing is living together? For friendship is a partnership, and as a
man is to himself, so is he to his friend; now in his own case the
consciousness of his being is desirable, and so therefore is the consciousness
of his friend's being, and the activity of this consciousness is produced when
they live together, so that it is natural that they aim at this. And whatever
existence means for each class of men, whatever it is for whose sake they value
life, in that they wish to occupy themselves with their friends; and so some
drink together, others dice together, others join in athletic exercises and
hunting, or in the study of philosophy, each class spending their days together
in whatever they love most in life; for since they wish to live with their
friends, they do and share in those things which give them the sense of living
together. Thus the friendship of bad men turns out an evil thing (for because
of their instability they unite in bad pursuits, and besides they become evil
by becoming like each other), while the friendship of good men is good, being
augmented by their companionship; and they are thought to become better too by
their activities and by improving each other; for from each other they take the
mould of the characteristics they approve-whence the saying 'noble deeds from
noble men'.-So much, then, for friendship; our next task must be to discuss
pleasure.
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