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UNIVERSITà DEGLI STUDI DI CATANIA
FACOLTà DI SCIENZE POLITICHE
CORSO DI LAUREA IN SCIENZE POLITICHE
The Foreign and Defence Policy of the European Union and the European Security System
Introduction 1
1st Chapter
Defining security 6
The changed nature of threats 10
Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the
European Union 17
1.3.1 The
1.3.2 The
1.3.3 From Saint Malo to
The new security dimension 41
Foreign and security policy as interest-driven 47
2nd Chapter
ENLARGEMENT AND THE COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY
Understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy 54
Enlargement as foreign policy 64
The challenge of enlargement: internal and external actors 75
The CFSP, enlargement and the transformation of
European political space 80
3rd Chapter
European security: myth or reality? 87
One security policy or several? 90
Federalist or Intergovernmental policy 95
Continuity and change in the European security agenda 98
The collective European security agenda: future
developments 102
New challenges facing the European security system 110
Conclusion 115
Bibliography 120
Cologne European Council - June 1999
With
the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the East-West relations
characterised by co-operative dependency, structural conditions and behavioural
patterns, concepts concerning European security have changed fundamentally.
Developments such as the political revolution in the east and its consequences
upon domestic and foreign policies, German unification, re-vitalised European
integration and the reduction of
The European Union has
made considerable progress over the last years, not just because there was a
practical need for it, but also because it was increasingly felt that the
growing European identity should find expression in the field of foreign and
security policy. Closer European co-operation, which met with fierce political
resistance in various member countries in the past, is forced on by events
today. Consequently, the old fear of loss of national sovereignty is being
relegated to the background by the development of practical co-operation. The
EU has, therefore, steadily grown as an actor in international affairs but its
power and influence are still predominantly in the domain of 'soft security'. It has important
political, economic, trade and financial instruments but it still has not
developed a credible military capability to support its diplomacy. As a central
element of this union, a Common Foreign and Security Policy is expected to turn
the Community into a more consistent and more influential international actor.
There are, however, encouraging signs that this may be changing. The turnaround
in British attitudes towards European defence and the changed views in
However, it is one thing
to agree that something should be done to improve the EU's ability to act and
another to achieve a consensus on exactly what should be done and to ensure
that it is done. On the eve of a new millennium the construction of
The research consists of three
chapters. The first chapter starts out by tracing the gradual building of the
CFSP, trying to explain why integration in the second pillar of the EU is
proving to be such a difficult task and examines how the reluctant growth of EU
integration in the security field has developed since the end of the Cold War.
The second chapter covers the European defence system and the related
enlargement issue. It starts out by highlighting different approaches to
understanding the CFSP, it examines then the various issues raised by the
prospect of enlargement to Central and
All in all, today difficulties are
seen as challenges which have to be met in a way which is compatible with the
particular characteristics of
1st Chapter
Defining Security
Apart from 'federalism',
there are few words used as often as 'security' in international relations
which suggest different meanings to different audiences. For the armed forces,
security usually has a military connotation;
for the inhabitants in most parts of
According to Arnold Wolfer security should be defined as "the absence of threats to acquired values" (Baylis 1997: 195). Expanding on this David Baldwin (1997: 5-26) consid 959c26j ers security to be a situation in which there is "a low probability of damage to acquired values". In international relations the state has almost automatically been considered the "referent object" of security. As for the values to be defended, these have also been taken for granted: ultimately it is the territorial integrity and political independence of the state that is to be protected.
These specifications to the concept of security are closely linked to a particular model of the international system: the Westphalian model. According to this model, striving for security is in many ways the ultimate concern of the foreign policies of states. This is linked to the assumption of anarchy in the international system. There is no superior authority that can 'lay down the law' from a more independent or objective position than the individual states. The international system is, in other words, seen to be in a 'state of nature'. In such a system, politics is a struggle for power where each state must look after its interests as best it can and with all available means. Questions of values or of morality are, therefore, considered to have little or no place in such a system: they only belong to domestic politics (Lenzi 1997).
During the Cold War the security and defence policies of West European states were to a large extent formulated according to the logic of the Westphalian model. It was during the post-Cold War period that the content of security was broadened and became more protean and ambiguous. An increased number and intensity of links in international society and a far-reaching institutional change in the European security space definitely initiated and marked the end of this single-coloured security concept. As a result the significance of the military dimension decreased as well. The necessity to use nuclear threat as a deterrent in the face of an obvious inferiority of conventional weapons no longer existed. The notion of security policy, consequently, was extended to cover contingencies for other types of threats. In addition to clear military elements, security started to contain political, economic, social, human and environmental dimensions, as the threat emerged from different sources. An effort to counter an increasing number of various threats required, therefore, common or at least concerted policies adaptable to the nature of a particular threat.
All this has contributed to the development of a 'new' security concept which gains in relevance as the complexity of our modern society grows.
The changed nature of threats
During the forty years of
the Cold War, the threats and dangers to security in
Moving away from the emphasis on defending the territory of the nation-state from an external military threat, discussions on security and defence policy increasingly began to focus on so-called non-territorial threats and to refer to an "enlarged" security concept. With the vanishing Soviet threat a political re-definition of 'threat' started to take root. The narrow traditional definition of 'security threat' as the product of damage and probability seemed legitimate in scenarios of all out nuclear warfare, bloc-confrontation and arms races. The changes in the East, however, not only downgraded the political relevance of the military but at the same time up-graded the importance of non-military threats, which until now were either non-existent, or constituted problems to a specific bloc and not to the entire security order. These non-military threats were considered to take the form of terrorism, drug-trafficking, nuclear waste and also ethnic conflict that might spread beyond a particular state-territory. Therefore, as the military threat declined, one has to move from a narrow to a broader understanding of security threats, which does not underestimate military ones but includes political, economic and others.
New and more diverse security threats have emerged, some indeed as a legacy of the communist era. Nearly all present-day conflicts are, in fact, 'within' rather than 'between' states. Among the most serious of these new threats are political and economic instability, the ethnic and border problems, organised crime and environmental degradation.
Organised crime, in particular drug trafficking, is much more serious than many issues that have traditionally been seen as a threat to national security because it poses a threat to security at three levels: the individual, the state and the international system. Organisations that deal in drugs can also traffic in technology and components for weapons of mass destruction. Whether the recipients of such transfer are terrorist organisations or 'pariah' states, the link between criminal activities and security is obvious. If non-proliferation and other regulatory regimes are to function effectively in future, it will be necessary to curb the activities of organised crime. This, of course, will not be easy.
Tackling many of the environmental
threats, which have often risen as a result of years of communist neglect will
also not be easy. All over the former
Equally
no one State can deal with the problems that characterise the regions on
EU policy[1], including assistance, to
the region is far more effective if carried out by the Fifteen acting together,
as in the Euro-Mediterranean (
Increasingly,
the focus turned from the 'state' to the 'individual' as the "referent object"
of security, and as to the values to be defended, these were no longer only the
territorial integrity of the state. In fact, in several instances, this
integrity was challenged in the name of principles of human rights. However,
the most important changes to the specifications of security had to do with the
types of threats that
The
changes in the specifications of security also led to changes in the perception
of what instruments might be most appropriate in security policy. Whereas the
favoured instrument of the Cold War was the military, this is no longer
necessarily considered the most efficient or appropriate instrument to maintain
security (Le Gloannec 1997: 83-98). Indeed much of the discussion on security
policy in
No one doubts that the military
dimension will de facto continue to change the nature of the European Union and
its ability to exercise influence outside the
Towards a Common Foreign and Security Policy in the European Union
The history of European integration since
1945 is indissociable from the history of attempts to create a relatively
autonomous European security and defence identity (ESDI). For decades, in fact,
the question of European defence had the dual and somewhat strange quality of
being both a necessary condition for and an obstacle to political deepening of
the European Union. It was a condition because only the possession of a minimum
of military means would ensure the credibility and effectiveness of any
international action by the
The Treaties of
The end of the Cold War radically
changed the security framework in
In parallel, a debate developed in
The
The Maastricht Treaty on European Union sought to revitalise European influence on international events by replacing European Political Co-operation (EPC) with the so-called Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) that would encourage the dozen, and later fifteen, member states to speak with one voice on the world stage. The aim of developing a policy that covered 'all areas of foreign and security policy' and that should be supported 'actively and unreservedly by its Member States in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity' was, clearly, stated into the Treaty. Thus, at a difference from the Single European Act, the Maastricht Treaty went further than to just write existing practice into the Treaty, and actually laid out new patterns for development in foreign and security policy (Grunert 1990).
As a follow-up to the
Maastricht Treaty, the WEU started to strengthen its own institutions and
develop military capabilities. In 1992, the so-called Petersberg declaration[4], which defined the WEU's
security tasks to include peace-keeping, crisis-management and 'soft security' , was issued. Institutional
adaptation to external change did nonetheless not take place with the expected,
or desired, efficiency. The 1990s were dominated by intense discussion about
'alternative security architectures' in
Expectations about the
disintegration of NATO after the 'loss' of its enemy did not come true. In fact
NATO, under General Secretary Manfred Wörner, turned out to be far more
efficient in redefining its role and its organisational structure after the
Cold War than the EU. From being a traditional military alliance whose purpose
it was to protect the territory of its member states against an external
threat, NATO developed a more flexible strategy, which amongst other things
would allow it to conduct peacekeeping operations outside NATO territory. The
continued relevance of NATO to European security was strengthened at the NATO
summit in
The struggle about the development
of EU foreign and security policy was also influenced by external political
events. The flaws, in fact, became obvious during the war in
The 'new NATO' was presented as an
institution which was far better suited to tackle the challenges that
Inside the EU attempts to follow up the ambitions of the Maastricht Treaty moved slowly. The 1996-7 Intergovernmental Conference[9], which resulted in the Amsterdam Treaty, was expected to clarify some of the uncertainty about the relationship between the WEU and the EU. Nonetheless, the result was seen as a victory for the Atlanticists. The independence of the WEU was maintained and the organisation seemed more and more as a protection against a too independent security role for the EU rather than as a defence arm directly subordinated to the EU.
The
The Amsterdam Treaty did not change the fundamentals of decision-making in foreign and security policy. A careful attempt was made at expanding qualified majority voting in the second pillar of political co-operation by writing into the Treaty that, after unanimous agreement on common strategies, the Council may proceed with majority voting for 'joint actions' and 'common positions' (Duff 1997: 14-16). This provision was restricted by a provision allowing member states 'for important and stated reasons of national policy' to oppose the adoption of a decision by qualified majority voting. Incidentally, this means that the French interpretation of the Luxembourg 'compromise' of 1966 was for the first time formally included in the Treaty, even though in a particular policy area. The principle of flexibility, which allows member states to refrain from participation in certain policies has sometimes been presented as a solution to the difficulties and complications resulting from increasingly divergent views on the further integration within the EU. This principle was not extended to the CFSP. Nonetheless, the possibility of 'constructive abstention' that was introduced in the Amsterdam Treaty does in practice allow a limited number of states to take initiatives in foreign policy without the full participation of all member states (Whitman 1999).
Another way of strengthening
integration and efficiency in foreign policy decision-making would be to
strengthen the role of the Commission. At the same time, this would also help
resolve the problem of inconsistency between pillars in external policy. From
being almost completely excluded from the former EPC, the Treaty of Maastricht
had increased the Commission's influence in the CFSP. Although the changes fell
short of the Commission's own ambitions in foreign policy, it did for the first
time become 'fully associated' to all aspects of the EU's foreign policy and
was given the right to propose policies. In response to this increased
recognition, the Commission's services were reorganised. A group composed of
the six Commissioners with involvement in external affairs was established and
began to meet regularly under the chairmanship of the new Commission President
Jacques Santer (Cameron 1996). However, this trend towards a stronger role for
the Commission was not taken any further with the Amsterdam Treaty. It has even
been suggested that
Presently, the new Commission, under the leadership of Prodi, seems to be making progress in terms of strengthening the legitimacy of the Commission. In the longer term this might facilitate a stronger role for the Commission in foreign and security policy (Cameron 1997).
In terms of enhancing the
cohesion and efficiency of the CFSP pillar, leadership is important. So far,
the Presidency has played a crucial role in this respect. Nonetheless, it has
been difficult to ensure consistency in the EU's external representation with
leadership rotating every six months. There is some concern that this will
become even more of a problem after the enlargement to
Overall, the first assessments of the Amsterdam Treaty were fairly negative. Most observers stressed that the member states had only made minimal adjustments compared to the Maastricht Treaty and that the principal weaknesses in the CFSP framework were still there (Seidelmann 1998). At the same time, it was argued that one should not exclude the possibility that the Treaty would allow the EU to develop a more cohesive foreign policy. Much was seen to depend on the way in which the institutional changes proposed were implemented, as well as on the political commitment of member states to use the new provisions. Regelsberger and Wessels (1996: 42-43) for example considered many of the problems of the CFSP to stem not from the rules or institutions alone, but from the member states' reluctance to 'play by the rules of the game which they themselves established'.
From
Saint Malo to
An important turning
point came in the autumn of 1998 after
The declaration, preceded by the statement
made by Tony Blair at the European Council held in October in Pörtschach
regarding the development of the European defence capacity, that did not
preclude the possibility of combining the WEU and the EU, became a milestone in
"full and rapid implementation of the
This revolution has made it possible to remove, one by
one, the political barriers that prevented the
Foreign and security policy is one
of the areas
The Saint Malo declaration was followed by systematic discussions amongst the member states of the EU on the practical shaping of co-operation in security and defence. The main decisions taken were essentially two: the European Council was to be given responsibility for framing a common security and defence policy under the European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy and the EU was to be given the capacity for autonomous action enhancing at the same time the robustness of the Atlantic Alliance. The issues which emerged from Saint Malo are, therefore, at the heart of the new European defence challenge.
The European Council
meeting in
The
Despite these changes and
clarifications, the relationship between NATO and the EU still remains
ambiguous. This is obvious if one compares the texts issued at NATO's
In the space of few months, from
Saint Malo to
The new security dimension
Whatever pressure events
may bring to bear, the terms of reference for any co-operative security system
will necessarily follow an intergovernmental pattern. Contrary to widespread
opinion, much ground has however already been covered by
The development of a foreign and
security dimension to the EU has been dependent on two factors in particular:
the first is the EU's relations to the
France has often played the role of
the driving force in foreign and security policy, but has received far less enthusiastic
support from Germany here than on other issues. This is primarily because of
The CFSP has changed both in terms
of its institutions and in terms of the content of policy. The changes in the
content of policy are fairly unambiguous. From concentrating exclusively on
foreign policy, the CFSP now also discusses security and to a certain extent
defence policy (Hurd 1994). This change is connected to broader developments in
the international system. The main purpose of security policy is no longer seen
to be to defend the territory of nation states from an external threat. It is
expected that European security tasks in future will focus increasingly on
non-territorial threats and operations in third countries. This change is
evident when one looks at the EU's efforts to define its security role. The
role of the EU is linked exclusively to these 'new' security tasks. The EU's
purpose is not to become a military alliance in the traditional sense. However,
this change is also evident inside NATO. Thus, the institutional changes have been
less important than what was expected in the immediate aftermath of the Cold
War. Likewise, the institutional mechanisms of the CFSP have only been
marginally adjusted. NATO continues to be an important security institution in
What is perhaps most striking about the developments in EPC-CFSP in the 1990s are the extreme swings in the assessment of its future prospects. The optimism with regard to the strengthening of the CFSP in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, which was replaced by pessimism after the Amsterdam Treaty has, after the Saint Malo declaration, returned. Anyway both internal and external factors will influence the future development of the EU's security and defence policy. Assessments of which factors should be considered most important do however depend on what kind of process we consider the EU to be. They depend on what kind of driving forces that we see as most influential in the development of the CFSP (Lodge and Flynn 1998). It is possible to distinguish between two fundamentally different perspectives on political processes in the international system: a realist perspective and a cosmopolitan perspective. These should be seen as analytical models, not empirical descriptions of reality. Thus, they are 'ideal types' that provide different concepts allowing us to analyse different dimensions of foreign policy co-operation in the EU. If one restricts oneself to one of these basic perspectives, some dimensions of the EU's foreign policy are likely to be ignored, because we lack the concepts necessary to capture them. The first approach tends to see co-operation as interest driven whereas the second approach focuses on discourse and sees the increased co-operation as the product of the spread of supranational norms and identities. These two analytical models are thus likely to have diverging perceptions of the question of the resilience of the CFSP.
The time has come to reassemble ideas and initiatives at centre field, where the core concepts of the CFSP should now emerge as the indispensable premise of any European Security and Defence Identity.
Foreign and security policy as interest-driven
From the perspective of the first analytical model, policy is seen as driven by material self-interest. From a classical realist perspective, interests are defined in terms of power (Morgenthau 1948: 45-58). Here, the international system is seen to be composed of sovereign states that act on the basis of material self-interest, without reference to common norms, identities or values. The international system is defined as anarchical, in other words, there is no overarching authority to identify common rules. Order is considered to be maintained as a result of a balance of power rather than as a result of a common authority as the case is in domestic politics. What counts in the end is power, measured in material terms as economic or military capabilities, not an assessment of whether or not actions are normatively right or 'good'. International institutions are, therefore, not attributed any independent role in his perspective. Co-operation will only be possible if states face a common external threat, as they did during the Cold War, or if their national interests coincide. When their interests cease to coincide, co-operation will also disintegrate. When other groups of states emerge as more attractive in terms of serving the national interest, loyalty to the EU will disappear (Buzan 1991).
Many studies of the CFSP, although not always explicitly theoretical, implicitly rely on the basic assumptions of this perspective (Hill 1996, Pijpers 1991, Ifestos 1987). In these studies, a clear distinction is drawn between the classic 'community method' of pillar one and foreign policy co-operation in pillar two. The intergovernmental structure of the CFSP decision-making process is seen as a manifestation of the limits to foreign policy co-operation in the EU.
The CFSP is often criticised for
having a slow decision-making system and for being incapable of acting
decisively, in particular in situations of international crises, such as
Most importantly,
interest-based perspectives can not explain why the CFSP occasionally succeeds,
or why it exists at all. They do not explain why the CFSP has proven to be so
durable. It becomes difficult from this perspective to understand the
criticisms that emerged towards
The classical power politics perspective has been further elaborated upon and modified into the neo-realist and neo-liberal perspectives on international relations. A central difference with the power based theories is that from the neo-realist and neo-liberal perspectives, the different strategies of negotiation, the calculations of actors, also contribute to explain the outcome in international politics. In the older, or 'classical realist' perspectives, the focus is mostly on the power resources of actors. Negotiation strategies are usually not taken into consideration when foreign policy is analysed. Amongst themselves, neo-realists and neo-liberals disagree on the likelihood of co-operation. Both perspectives accept that the anarchical nature of the international system put particular constraints on co-operation. Yet, neo-realists consider international anarchy to represent a greater hindrance to inter-state co-ordination than the neo-liberals do. The two perspectives also disagree on whether or not states have a common interest in co-operating: the neo-realists consider states to be mostly interested in relative gains, whereas the neo-liberals stress states' interest in maximising their absolute gains. Nonetheless, when it comes to their basic assumptions about what are the central driving forces in international politics, the differences between these perspectives are small (Risse-Kappen 1995: 20-23). According to Risse-Kappen (1995: 26), neo-liberal institutionalism should not be regarded as part of the liberal paradigm. This 'co-operation under anarchy' perspective shares all realist core assumptions, but disagrees with structural realists on the likelihood of international co-operation among self-interested actors. Furthermore, their starting point, that material interests are the central driving forces in foreign policy, is one that they share with the classical realist perspective. Actors are seen to calculate rationally on the basis of their interests. Indeed, it has been suggested that the differences between the classical realists and the neo-realist liberals is principally one of methodology.
Neo-realist and neo-liberal perspectives have rarely been applied directly to the CFSP or the EU. Nonetheless, one of the dominant theories of European integration, neo-liberal institutionalism draws on elements from both these approaches. Neo-liberal institutionalists pay little attention to the CFSP, arguing that foreign policy co-operation in the second pillar is different in character from the first pillar. In other words, the idea of a fundamental distinction between high and low politics and a separation between the two pillars, based on differences in their decision-making system is maintained in some of the most influential present day theories of the EU. Hence, in terms of providing an alternative perspective from the classical realist position on the CFSP, these recent theories are of limited use. In order to highlight such issues, we need a different perspective on international politics altogether. This perspective takes as its starting point that the international system is more complex than what interest based theories assumes.
2nd Chapter
Understanding the Common Foreign and Security Policy
Little attention has been paid to the relationship between enlargement and the Common Foreign and Security Policy of the European Union. Discussions about the widening of the EU largely refer to its implications for the Community pillar (the 'first pillar'), although, eastern enlargement also poses important challenges to the CFSP or 'second pillar' (Avery and Cameron 1998). Not only does it raise questions about the CFSP's ability to function effectively, but also, by redefining the EU's borders, it promises to introduce new issues and new tasks into the scope of the CFSP.
It has often been pointed out that the
CFSP, as well as its predecessor European Political Co-operation, is 'poorly served by theory' (Holland 1991:
2). Scientists of international relations have not yet succeeded in developing
concepts and theories that fully allow to understand foreign policy
co-operation within the EU and the EU's role in the international system. Much
of the literature on this dimension of European integration identifies itself
as 'pre-theoretical' (Hill 1993).
Also, the focus is often on the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP: it is
seen, at best, as little more than the sum of the foreign policies of the
Member States. In addition, given its limited capabilities in security and
defence, the CFSP is considered to be much less influential in foreign affairs
than individual member states. The failure of the CFSP to resolve the crisis in
If we draw exclusively on realist
assumptions about international relations, the difficulties of the CFSP are
unsurprising: in an anarchical world 'national interests' will inevitably clash
and co-operation will remain the exception to the rule. However, there is also
an increasing body of literature that points to the considerable influence
exerted by the EU, if not in the international system, then at least in
Allen and Smith, have emphasised
the difficulty in studying
Some evidence of a
'Europeanisation' of foreign policy can be found in the literature on national
European foreign policies. Tonra (1997: 197) has found that, in the cases of
However, this does not mean that the CFSP is a common foreign policy in the sense prescribed by the Treaty of Maastricht. According to the Treaty, the CFSP shall be 'supported actively and unreservedly by its Member States in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity'. Furthermore, the CFSP is supposed to cover 'all areas of foreign and security policy'. Yet it would be naive to pretend other than that national foreign policies remain strong and that reaching a consensus, in particular in situations of crisis which require rapid responses, remains difficult. Identifying shared interests and reconciling different national foreign policy traditions is a challenge. Thus, this literature does not confirm traditional assumptions about integration. It does not see an automatic link between economic integration and the development of a common foreign policy. Neither does it suggest, in neo-functionalist fashion, that it is only a matter of time before control of foreign policy is moved from the national to the supranational level. It merely points out that it is possible to detect a gradual process of change even in foreign policy making. Furthermore, it suggests that we need to pay closer attention to the dynamic interaction between the national and the European levels in order to understand political co-operation. We do not know the end station of this process and we must reflect on the possibility that it may never lead to one single European foreign policy in the traditional sense of the word.
This literature is not directly concerned with enlargement. However, the different approaches are likely to lead us to different conclusions about the impact of enlargement on political co-operation. If one takes an intergovernmentalist perspective, it seems probable that enlargement will 'atomise' the CFSP (Graham and Cameron 1998). Successful inter-state bargaining is more difficult with twenty or twenty-five Member States than with fifteen. However, if one considers foreign policy-making within the EU to be a process where national and European levels interact and mutually influence each other, different conclusions may be reached. The neo-functionalist perspective does address the relationship between enlargement and foreign policy co-operation (Spence 1994). Schmitter (1996) uses the concept of externalisation to suggest that integration has negative effects on actors outside the EU, and that their application for membership should be seen as a direct response to a fear of exclusion from European co-operation. In turn, he expects increased membership to strengthen activities in external relations as a result of the new trade and diplomatic relationships brought into the EU's 'orbit' by the new Member States (Schmitter 1996). Hence, the concept of externalisation 'partially explains why non-members press the EC to act as a unit; what effects this outside charge has on the EC; and the outcome of EC foreign policy actions that are executed in response to outside pressure' (Ginsberg 1989: 25). As we shall see later, the notion of externalisation and spillover does seem to have some relevance for enlargement. One does nonetheless have to be careful to avoid the sense of inevitability of such developments. Whatever the external pressure to enlarge, it did not lead to a strengthening of the CFSP framework in the Amsterdam Treaty. Before looking more closely at this issue it is useful to examine how the enlargement process in itself is an important foreign policy instrument for the EU.
Enlargement as foreign policy
The eastward enlargement, or, the expansion of the European Union is one of the most important and difficult challenges facing Europe in the post-Cold War period and is likely to transform the political and economic landscape. Enlargement has, in fact, been at the heart of the European Community's (EC) identity from the start and the EU has defined itself as a 'widening' organisation in so far as any 'democratic nation' of Europe was a potential member. The acquis communautaire provides an important normative basis for expansion eastward,[16] although the current potential is qualitatively different in scope than past accessions, which have only involved a few countries at a time.
So far, the European Union has absorbed
new members and more than doubled its membership from the original six
signatories to the Treaty of Rome in 1957. This has not been done without
difficulties, but it has been done without radical changes to the institutional
structures of the EU. Generally, the existing members have shared a common
historical, political and economic culture and the framework of the EU has been
able to accommodate the tensions which have inevitably existed. The accession
of
The
question is of the utmost importance, because the EU enlargement was not
clearly envisioned in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War. The EU had taken
steps, with the Single European Act, the common market project of "Europe '92"
and the Maastricht Treaty, to deepen European integration; many saw the
potential of widening to a group of 'fragile democracies' in the East as
undesirable if not destabilising. The decision to enlarge the European Union to
the Eastern European Countries (EEC), which has effectively been taken, will
therefore challenge the existing arrangements to a greater extent than any
enlargement undertaken so far, and it seems far from certain that the existing
institutional framework of the European Union will be able to meet this
challenge unchanged. The way in which the EU handles the enlargement issue will
have profound consequences not only for the many applicant states, but also for
the EU itself as well as its neighbouring 'non-applicant' states. The risks
involved in the enlargement process are well known to the EU. In fact "...the
lengthy process of eastern and south-eastern enlargement is a prospect which is
prompting a good deal of nervousness among practitioners". Not only does
enlargement threaten to disturb the internal order of the EU, the new external
borders that will follow from the expansion could also create new divisions on
the European continent and thus foster instability in
Enlargement of the European Union is, in itself, a form of EU foreign policy. It puts the EU in a position to shape large parts of applicant states' domestic and foreign policies. Traditional principles of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other states seem to be set aside in this process. At the same time, because enlargement aims at including external actors, it is ultimately only a passing phase in a longer process which 'domesticates' what were previously foreign relations. In turn, enlargement is often then seen to threaten the very foundations of the policy that made it possible. As Karen Smith notes, after the Eastern enlargement it is possible that: "the logic of integration will stall, having produced the very policy that now renders uncertain its future vitality" (Smith K. 1995: 404).
Despite the fact that it was only
officially put on the EU's agenda at the Copenhagen European Council summit in
1993, the issue of enlargement became the predominant theme in the EU's
policies towards Central and
Others see the EU's
policies towards Central and
The divergent assessments
of the EU's policy towards Central and Eastern Europe are in part the result of
conflicting views on how the EU should balance the choice between what it ought
to do and what it is able to do. The Commission argues that enlargement is both
costly and time consuming and that not only the EU but also the applicant
states would lose out economically as well as politically by starting the
process too soon. Yet, at the same time, the key role played by the Commission
in moving the enlargement issue forward on the EU's agenda should not be
underestimated. The Commission has not, however, been able effectively to
communicate its views to prospective Member States and to convince them of the
legitimacy of its approach. Furthermore, Member States have given somewhat contradictory
signals to Central and
On the positive side, the
experience in Central and
To what extent is this experience applicable to other areas of the EU's foreign relations, Karen Smith suggests that Eastern Europe is a special case where the production of a common policy with supranational elements was feasible due to Eastern Europe's geographic proximity, the sense of a shared history between East and West in Europe and a belief that the EU has a particular responsibility for events in Central and Eastern Europe. These particular circumstances can not easily be reproduced in other areas of the EU's external activities. Michael Smith (1998: 77-94) has given this a different interpretation by suggesting that the CFSP is in fact marginal to the EU's external policies. Against the backdrop of the wider process of globalisation, the 'special status' of foreign policy is being reduced. What matters increasingly in the international system are economic and trade issues. Consequently, according to Smith, it is through its external economic relations that the EU develops its presence in the international system and it is here, rather than at the CFSP, that we should be looking when examining the EU's external role.
The challenge of enlargement: internal and external actors
The prospect of
enlargement to Central and
We do not as yet know enough about
how interests are formed at the EU level, and we need to reflect further on how
the interests and ideas of new Member States affect, and are affected by, the
overall dynamic of foreign policy co-operation. Experience from previous
enlargements seems to suggest that Member States' perceptions of their
interests undergo change as a result of membership. Consequently, taking
presumed 'national interests' as a starting point for examining possible
effects of enlargement on the CFSP may not be satisfactory. Before the 1995
enlargement to
Security issues are also likely to
come into focus as a result of enlargement to Central and
Even if the EU were to
succeed in strengthening the institutional network of the CFSP, this may not in
itself be enough to ensure a common foreign policy - and particularly not in a
larger EU. The CFSP already has difficulties identifying common interests, and
it is not at all certain that institutional provisions, on their own, would
suffice to change this. A coherent foreign policy would also require some basis
in a common identity. In this respect the challenge of the Eastern enlargement
is larger than with previous enlargements that took place in the context of
fixed political borders:
The CFSP, enlargement and the transformation of European political space
According to Allen the
CFSP suffers from an inherent contradiction: "the determination to preserve national foreign policy is ultimately at
odds with the ambition to create a European foreign policy" (Allen 1998: 64).
He suggests that two 'cultures' compete for control of European foreign policy
- one representing the desire to preserve national autonomy in foreign policy
(institutionalised in the Council) and one aiming to create a common foreign
policy (represented institutionally by the Commission). The possibilities of
strengthening the EU's performance in international relations while maintaining
what is essentially an intergovernmental framework are considered limited.
Nonetheless, neither the
We have suggested that
the relationship between enlargement and the CFSP is more complex than what is
suggested by the widening-deepening dichotomy. There are also indications of
change in European foreign policy that cannot be captured by concentrating
exclusively on the institutional characteristics of the CFSP, and which suggest
that enlargement does not have to atomise political co-operation. One dimension
to the changes taking place in European foreign policy is what Allen (1998:
41-58) has referred to as the process of 'Brusselisation' of European foreign
policy. Although foreign policy remains in the control of the nation state and
has not been transferred in any substantial way to the European Commission, it
has become more difficult for the foreign ministries of the Member States to
control the foreign policy process. Foreign policy is increasingly made in
Without the corresponding
development of a shared identity, the 'Brusselisation' of foreign policy is
unlikely to lead to a cohesive foreign policy. In this area, the signals are
mixed. There is no European foreign policy identity. Nevertheless, the
identities of
Traditionally, the EU's external identity has been built around the notion of a civilian power. According to Waever (1996), the efforts to build a European identity are now given a slightly different meaning. He argues that efforts to build a European identity are increasingly being linked to the issue of security. This, according to Waever gives a sense of urgency to integration: its alternative - fragmentation - is presented as destructive to the whole European project (Waever 1996: 123).
Efforts to build an identity based
on the idea of integration as a process of securitisation seem close to the
perspectives of the applicant states in Central and
It may still be that enlargement
will provoke new divisions between existing Member States and thus lead to
changes and even blockages within the CFSP. Françoise de la Serre (1996: 32)
has pointed to such concerns in
The CFSP is unsettled. It
is being 'constructed' against the backdrop of a broad and complex process of
change in European inter-state relations. Inside the EU, it is becoming more
difficult to distinguish between domestic and foreign policy. Increasingly
large parts of what was traditionally under the control of foreign ministries
is now taken care of by 'technical' ministries. In this context, it is often
suggested that a system of 'multilevel governance' is developing in
This chapter has
highlighted the different ways in which the CFSP is assessed, both by
policy-makers and in the academic literature. It has suggested that although
3rd Chapter
European Security: myth or reality?
European security policy, its security structures and institutions, have for the last several years been in a state of rapid transformation. The many moves by the Western nations in the field of security and defence, at times contradictory, must be seen in the context of these changes and in the context of the need to adapt to developments in the international environment taking place at breathtaking speed.
The quest for more
communality in security and defence matters among the Western European nations
is mainly motivated by the desire to take on a leadership role in European
security affairs at a time when the two superpowers of the Cold War have either
disappeared, or - as in the case of the USA - seemingly have renounced the
claim to be the "primus inter partes" of the Western camp. The end of the Cold
War, however, has not only increased the possibility to establish independent
and European common foreign and security policy, but at the same time has also
decreased the ability to actually reach this goal (Eliassen 1998). The
difficulties to establish a European
security policy has, on the one hand, given its NATO allies in Europe more room
to manoeuvre politically and, among other things, has opened the way to a
deepening of European security integration, independent from, but still allied
to the USA, more or less in line with the "Gaullist" perspective of the 1960s.
On the other hand, the evaporation of the threat from a presumed aggressive
As the title of this paragraph indicates, the analytical point of departure is that there may be, on the one hand, a "myth" of European security integration and, on the other side, are political "realities" that to some extent contradict the "mythological" version of the issue at hand. Building on this supposition, the short analysis of this third chapter will attempt to investigate the conflict between the ideal of European integration in the sphere of security and the political realities as they emerge in terms of more or less conflicting views on the central security and defence issues of the last years. The analysis will, furthermore, focus on the continuity and change as well as to the future challenges and developments that the European security agenda will have to face in the next future.
One security policy or several?
Considering past
experience there are grounds to question whether exists any viable European
security alternative. The fundamental preference for a future European security
integration, not directly linked to NATO and not based upon an American
security guarantee, is based on a common European security system, which is
strong enough to compel the Europeans to act in concert to achieve common goals
(Brotons 2000). Events since 1991 have, regrettably, proved otherwise. Foremost
on the list of failures is the mismanagement of the break-up of the Former
Yugoslavia. The CFSP, established by
In addition to this, European nations did
not frequently 'trust' each other. The reluctance to act and possibly to pay
the costs in
A
factor that cuts across party lines is the question of what role the
On either side of this perspective there are diverging views. In a view that could be called the 'do it our way', there are those who believe that the United States should pursue its global role with only minimal reference to the views of other nations or the role of international institutions and multilateral co-operation.
In a contrary perspective, in what might be called the 'you do it' school, some scientists argue for a much more minimalist US global leadership role, allowing the nation to tend to its domestic problems while allies and others take care of their own security problems.
The first perspective sees a potentially
important place for European contributions in alliance with the
Therefore a truly European security policy is, according most of the international doctrine, not likely to emerge for many years. Unless and until the members of the European Union have achieved something approaching political union, a stable European security system will, in fact, remain under NATO hegemony and subject to the wide range of perceptions of national interest that exist among current and potential EU members (Heisbourg 1999). The US should, therefore, continue the process of handing over Balkan operations to the European members of NATO, but should also insist that the operations remain within NATO frame of reference under predominantly European leadership to demonstrate that a European pillar need to be constructed outside the Alliance in order to allow Europe more room for authority and leadership in security policy.
Federalist or intergovernmental policy
The obvious answer to the problem of strengthening European security integration is to strengthen the supranational character of the EU in the sphere of security and defence. Evidence that this is exactly what is being thought in certain quarters, is to be found in a recent report commissioned by the European Union and prepared by a panel of 14 government officials and private experts which states that: "European security landscape has changed beyond recognition in the last five years but the European Union's institutional structure is stuck in the past. (...) The European Union must assume a role in foreign and security policy equal to that of its authority in the economic sphere".
The recommendations of the report are, among other things, that the operational responsibilities of NATO's Military Committee should be replaced by an "invigorated" WEU, and that consultation among national capitals on approval of military intervention, should be transferred to a body of the WEU to be decided by a majority vote. Working on the 'functionalist' presumption that integration is self-supporting and tends to expand to new area once set in motion, these proposals seem perfectly rational, but restricted by the limitations set by the insistence on national sovereignty on security issues, such a development will most likely be extremely hard to come by. So, while this move would solve today's problems in co-ordinating European security policy, such a 'federalist leap' goes much too far for today's EU-members to accept. Predictably, UK (former) defence minister Malcolm Rifkin , affirmed that: "La politique de défence européenne doit rester intergouvernementale, parce que nous parlons d'envoyer nos jeunes soldats dans des pays où leur vie peut être en danger. On attend dans chaque pays que cela soit decidé par le gouvernement et les parlements nationaux".
Even though the goal of a common security
system remains in place, European security co-operation will probably remain
intergovernmental and dependent upon the framework of NATO for the foreseeable
future. On the other side, the European pillar will have to become more
integrated and less dependent on
Continuity and change in the European security agenda
The changes to the
specifications of security should not be seen as the exclusive result of the
end of the Cold War. They must be understood in the context of broader changes
in the European system of states (Baldwin 1997: 5-26). Also, these "alternative
approaches" to security were not new with the end of the Cold War. They
constituted the basis on which for example the
A principal consequence
of these broader changes to the international system is that the privileged
status of the state is challenged. With these challenges to the state the very
basis upon which security policy has been built is also questioned. It is
possible to note three conditions that illustrate the internal and external
challenges to the state. Firstly, the emergence of new issues at the
international political agenda in
These challenges to the state constitute an opportunity to (re-) open the questions of the basis on which security policy should be formulated. When the referent object of security - the nation state - can no longer be taken as a given, the legitimacy of a security policy that relies exclusively on national security is also questionable. Hence, the question of the basis on which we should develop European security policy - which interests, values, norms should be promoted and protected - comes to the fore. The normative dimension to security policy becomes visible.
It must, however, be added that although
most agree that European security is changing, there is considerable
uncertainty in assessments of the extent of change to the conception of
security as well in the evaluation of the implications of such a change. A
sense of security or insecurity is subjective to a large extent. An important
question thus becomes the direction in which policy-makers chose to take the
issue. To summarise, security policy in
The collective European security agenda: future developments
It is a truism to observe that if 'security' is placed above everything else, fundamental principles of democracy and respect for human rights can easily be jeopardised. As we know, reference to the primacy of security has, and still is, used as a mean to repress dissent. This means that introducing an enlarged security concept could be a mixed blessing. Turning new issues, for example issues of immigration, into questions of security is obviously problematic. Such initiatives can easily spill over into other dimensions of domestic politics such as treatment of minorities, asylum and immigration policies. The net result might be to create internal enemies and have these replace the external enemies.
The EU's aim of developing "an area of freedom, security
and justice" represents serious risks of impeding on the individual liberties
of the citizens of
However, returning to a "narrow"
definition of security is not in itself enough. Or to put it differently, it is
not the enlarged security concept or the domesticating of security that is the
problem. What matters are the basis on which security policy is developed and
the purposes that security policies are supposed to fulfil both domestically and
internationally. What is taking place in
If we consider political processes
exclusively as processes of competition for power and actors as interested only
in maximising self-interest the interpretation would nonetheless be that there
are few "real" changes to security in Europe and that an emphasis on an
enlarged security concept only reflects a change of strategy by the "real"
powers in
The potential for such
developments seems stronger today than previously because of the high degree of
institutionalisation at the supranational level. Traditionally, international
law was not seen as an instrument that should protect individuals from abuses
of power but as an instrument that would guarantee the sovereign control of the
state over a specific territory. With the strengthening of the United Nations,
the principles of human rights have gained more force in international politics
in general. However, unless these principles become positive legal rights it is
difficult to avoid the suspicion that they only reflect the self-interest of
the most powerful: "Things look different when human rights not only come into
play as a moral orientation for one's own political activity, but as rights
which have to be implemented in a legal sense. Human rights possess the
structural attributes of subjective rights which, irrespective of their purely
moral content, by nature are dependent on attaining positive validity within a
system of compulsory law." (Habermas 1999: 270). A move in this direction is
particularly visible in
The expectation of legitimisation of political choices vis à vis "the other" is therefore particularly strong in a European context. National choices are more visible at the international level. In addition, national choices concern the other directly. There are now agents outside the nation state that can sanction illegitimate abuses of power and that citizens can appeal to if national decisions seem unacceptable. This is visible both in the EU's charter and in the European human rights. Hence human rights are not just moral categories, but also positive legal rights. It is expected of European states today that they respect human rights and basic civil and political rights (Zürn 2000). In such a context security policy increasingly becomes an instrument to uphold the law rather than an instrument to defend self-interest in a system of anarchy. Respect for democracy and human rights become conditions for security.
It has been suggested, in the first chapter of this research, that the changes in the European political system open up for the possibility of rethinking the basis on which security policy is formulated. During the Cold War the security policies of West European nation states were primarily based on what David Held has defined as pragmatic considerations (Holland 1987: 182). Bipolarity and the need for a balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact was taken as a given. This situation was not necessarily considered satisfactory from an ideal normative perspective, however, it was accepted as inevitable. Indeed the assumption was that the situation could not be any different.
With the combined effects of the end of the Cold War and the increased influence of supranational institutions, the political context is changed. What were pragmatic responses during the Cold War might not be pragmatic responses in this different political context. To change established policies is however not self-evident. Vested interests in maintaining status quo may be strong. Furthermore, large institutions such as states are often reluctant to undertake important processes of change. Hence, although there seems to be a rational consensus around the idea that security policy should be built on a different basis, there is no guarantee that reason will prevail.
Hence, it has not been suggested in this research that competition for power and conflict of interests do not matter in politics. Such a suggestion would be naive. However, it would be equally unrealistic to assume that an analysis based only on these premises can capture political processes in all their complexities. What has been suggested here then is that security policy can be seen as an expression of a particular view, at a particular time, of how political relations should be organised. And furthermore, that this particular view is now different from what it was in the period called the 'Cold War'. The new political context suggests that those exercising power also at an international level need to refer to a legal and rational basis for their decisions. The continued predominance of this view will depend on how the West Europeans go about building and expanding their collective security institutions.
New challenges facing the European security system
It was in the space of a year, from Saint
Malo to
Of course the list of challenges that the
Fifteen will collectively have to face in the coming years is impressive. None
the less, the drawing up of guiding principles for meeting these challenges
does not seem to be something that is out of reach. Depending on the subject at
issue, the main challenges could be stated as follows: 'co-ordination essential and subordination unacceptable': the
establishing of relations between the Union and NATO will without doubt be one
of the most delicate issues to be settled for the maintenance of transatlantic
harmony. The Union cannot see its status reduced to that of NATO subcontractor
any more than the
'Discrimination
prohibited and differentiation legitimate': since all the European countries are involved in the
future of the Continent, all must be able to participate in the European
Union's military activities. But because the
'No defence without a CFSP': all the armies in the world and all conceivable institutional arrangements would be of dubious effectiveness in the absence of a true common foreign policy that allowed them to be used. Now, the CFSP mechanisms are not necessarily best suited to achieving a consensus among the fifteen member countries. Neither flexibility nor enhanced co-operation appears on the agenda of the Intergovernmental Conference, it is, therefore, difficult to see how the Union will be able to continue to evade the question of the way it makes decisions on foreign policy issues, in other words of the conditions under which its military instruments are to be used.
'No
capabilities without cash':
the question of military expenditure is without doubt the most politically
difficult for all the democratic governments of the European Union. Overall it
is of course for the
'No
instruments without a strategy': by definition, and following past practice, the European Union has so
far not really developed a common strategic culture. Of course, by political
choice the question of collective self-defence, in other words a European union
'article 5', does not arise, and therefore asking it serves no purpose. On the
other hand the autonomous management of the Petersberg missions presupposes
that member countries acquire and develop common principles on the use of
force, its legitimacy, the role of the UN, the notion of interference and the
principle of sovereignty, and that they form a common vision of the Union's
strategic ambition, the areas in which it might intervene, a doctrine on the
use of its forces, etc. None of these questions was resolved at the time of the
Western intervention in
Of course, a lot remains to be done before the EU security system will be up and running. First and foremost EU analysis and planning capabilities must be developed, common strategies and communications systems improved but, above all, relations with NATO, non-EU NATO members and EU candidates clarified. However, the fact that so much progress has been achieved in such a short time is certainly spectacular in its scope, pace and momentum and clearly shows that the political will to act in the defence field is now a reality. A EU role in defence and security issues has definitely been accepted and there is no way back to this inexorable revolution.
Conclusion
The year 2000 marked a decade since the formal ending of the Cold War period and the outset of transformations of the Cold War bipolar international system. A decade is a sufficient interval to take stock of the changes that the old international system had undergone and to assess how far the creation of the new one has progressed. The layout and functioning of the newly shaped security structure and the degree of the security it provides are the key elements for appraising the nature and the real outcomes of the changes made so far.
Today the European Union is a
positive factor for peace not just in the wider
It is true that pooling sovereignty
in the area of foreign policy is still a sensitive issue for some, but there is
a new and widespread recognition that the problem's of today's world can only
be tackled by working together. The EU has today a political and legal
framework to adopt common strategies and decide on common actions in foreign
and security policy. The core of this policy has to remain the full integration
of all countries of the region into the political and economic mainstream of
Apart from
those countries which are already candidates most of the others benefit from
the network of Stabilisation and Association Agreements. These Agreements must
have sufficient flexibility to respond to the specific and changing needs of
each country in the region. It is, therefore, useful to place sufficient
emphasis on the need for conditionality, but at the same time to be ready to
offer generous terms, for example in the field of trade, where this is going to
have a direct impact on economic development and stability. This has not always
been the case so far. One of the key
results of the Helsinki European Council in December 1999 was to set an
objective to provide the
Important steps have also been
taken to ensure that appropriate measures are in place for the consultation and
co-operation with non-EU European allies and with NATO. All Member States have
agreed that the
It is, therefore, in our own
interests to work for greater peace, stability and security, not only in
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For example, after the 1972 enlargement,
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